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Executive Summary 
 
Kentucky constitutional and statutory law requires that a fair process be in place to let a property owner challenge 
a condemnor’s right to acquire private property, including a right to appeal the initial decision. Property acquired by 
a condemnor must be for public use, and property owners have the right to an immediate and expedited hearing on 
right-to-take. Two of these requirements will remain in place regardless of statutory revisions: the requirement that 
property must be needed (i.e., not arbitrary) for public use, and the right to one appeal. Only an amendment(s) to 
the Kentucky Constitution would alter these requirements. The right to an expedited hearing is granted by statute 
and subject to statutory revisions. Most condemnation practitioners perceive the frequency of right-to-take 
challenges as holding steady, while other see them as increasing.  
 
Attorneys report that most property owners make right-to-take challenges because they perceive the condemnor’s 
offer of just compensation as unfair. Attorneys also observe that property owners sometimes leverage challenges 
as a delay tactic or to minimize a project’s impact on their property. Kentucky has what the legal community 
considers a quick take approach to eminent domain, which means that the right to access and use property is 
obtained before a final determination is made on compensation. While a property owner is free to make right-to-
take challenge or appeal an unsatisfactory decision of a challenge, Kentucky’s Eminent Domain Act and legal 
precedents require expedited trials and appeals of this issue. Additionally, condemnation practitioners currently 
have tools at their disposal to help prevent a challenge or overcome delays in resolving a challenge.  
 
A range of solutions are available to improve the right-to-take process. For example, before identifying a parcel as 
requiring condemnation, preventative measures can be taken during right-of-way negotiations and must be 
implemented with Division of Right of Way agents working more closely with attorneys prior to. Other solutions can 
be adopted through more efficient record keeping during a roadway project’s planning and acquisition phases. 
Attorneys litigating these cases can leverage a number of legal tools, including the use of an Agreed Interlocutory 
Order and Judgment; dismissing suits and refiling them after a perceived deficiency has been corrected; a more 
informed understanding of stays with a selective use of supersedeas bonds, and Civil Rule 11 sanctions (imposition 
of attorney fees). Early right of entry agreements are also available. One strategy not fully available in Kentucky is a 
statutory requirement holding that the losing party pay attorney fees if a challenge is made. A condemnor can 
request — and has been awarded — attorney’s fees after a successful defense of a right-to-take challenge. However, 
the award is discretionary and will only be granted in the face of egregious conduct.  
 
Compared to other states, Kentucky employs similar resolution methods (e.g., monetary settlements, plan changes). 
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Chapter 1 Legal History of Challenging the Right-to-Take in Kentucky 
 
Right-to-take challenges delay a condemnor’s project delivery schedule. Issuing efficient and effective responses to 
these challenges is critical for successful project completion. This report extrapolates information from Kentucky 
case law to assess trends in decisions and strategies for preventing and litigating these challenges. A condemnor’s 
right-of-way staff can use the ideas presented here to better understand right-to-take challenges and legal staff can 
use the information as a resource. The remainder of this chapter introduces key definitions and issues related to 
right-to-take challenges. Table 1.1 summarizes the report’s structure.  
 
Table 1.1 Report Contents 
Chapter 2 • Review of 2020 national-level attorney surveys on right to take 
Chapter 3 • Practices used to negotiate right-to-take challenges and issues which hinder resolution  
Chapter 4 • Detailed assessment of how Kentucky courts have ruled on right-to-take cases 
Chapter 5 • Presents eight strategies condemnation practitioners can implement to expedite 
handing of right-to-take challenges 
Chapter 6 • Review of right-to-take processes and statues in other states 
Chapter 7 • Conclusions  
 
Analysis presented in this report draws from our review of Kentucky appellate decisions covering right-to-take 
challenges within condemnation cases. Procedurally, a case was first decided by a trial court and later appealed. We 
do not address cases that were not appealed or are currently being litigated. The review includes decisions from the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court, with Supreme Court decisions being the final word on an 
issue. For those unfamiliar with legal citations, Court of Appeals decisions have “Ky. App.” immediately preceding 
the decision’s date, e.g. (Ky. App. 2021). For Supreme Court decision, the citation is designated by “Ky.” immediately 
preceding the date of the decision, (e.g., (Ky. 2021)). If looking at the decision and not the citation, confusion may 
arise over which court is making the decision due to the history of the Kentucky Court system. Historically, the system 
included a county court in each Kentucky county which served as the trial court. Under this old system, the first-level 
appellate court was the Circuit Court which heard trial court appeals from more than one county. The second and 
final level of appellate court was the Court of Appeals. In 1972 Kentucky courts were reorganized. County courts 
were abolished, and circuit courts became trial courts. The first level of appeal was to the Court of Appeals and the 
second and final level of appeal was to the newly created Kentucky Supreme Court. It is possible for a pre-1972 
decision to state at the beginning of the opinion that it is an opinion from the Court of Appeals. However, the citation 
will indicate it is from the highest Kentucky appellate court (e.g. (Ky. 1971)). If so, the opinion is from Kentucky’s 
then-highest court and should be treated as the authority on the issue just as Kentucky Supreme Court decisions are 
after 1972.  
 
Although the majority of cases referenced are related to Kentucky’s transportation agency, the review includes any 
decision where the power of eminent domain is invoked to acquire personal or real property. These opinions relate 
to the how the power of eminent domain is regulated and resolved and is not limited to the entity that has the 
constitutional or statutory power to wield it. 
 
1.1 The Kentucky and United States Constitutions 
In 1792 Kentucky ratified its first Constitution. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights states that “All men have certain inherent 
and inalienable rights.” This section lists seven basic rights, with the fifth being “the right of acquiring and protecting 
property.” Section 2 of the Bill of Rights is also noteworthy. It guarantees the right to be free from “Absolute and 
arbitrary power over our lives, liberty and property.” No one can abrogate a Kentuckian’s right to this freedom —
not even a majority of its citizens.1 
 
                                                                
1 See Kentucky Constitution 1792, Bill of Rights, Section 1, Fifth subsection, and Section 2. 
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At three subsequent constitutional conventions2 Kentucky’s Constitution was amended but language mandating due 
process provisions for any entity invested with the authority of taking private property for public use — eminent 
domain — remained steadfast. However, the power of eminent domain can only be exercised for a legitimate public 
use. It cannot be used by edict (absolutism), and a fair system of oversight must be in place when this power is used.3  
 
Later amendments to Kentucky’s Constitution clarify the limitation of eminent domain — no person shall, “… be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”4 The most recent amendment dealing with a person’s relationship to property affirmed 
this principal and defined what process is due: “… nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use 
without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being previously made to him.”5  
 
Likewise, the US Constitution mandates that no state can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”6 The state may 
not seize property from an owner without providing due process and just compensation. Nor can property be 
acquired through actions that are arbitrary or treat owners unequally. Due process lets property owners challenge 
the use of eminent domain on the grounds of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.7 These protections cannot be 
statutorily excluded from the remedies available to a property owner. 
 
1.2 Statutory Mandate and Case Law Interpretation of the Constitutional Process Due  
It is helpful to understand the distinction between eminent domain and condemnation. Eminent domain is the power 
of an entity to take private property for public use. Condemnation is the process by which the entity exercises that 
power.8 For example, KRS §177.021 and KRS §177.081 describe the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s (KYTC) power 
to acquire property, while KRS §416.540-670 specify steps for employing that power. Kentucky’s Rules of Civil 
Procedure (CR) as set by the Judicial Branch dictate timelines and judicial actions for the condemnation process.9  
 
1.2.1 When and How a Right-to-take Challenge Can be Made 
In Kentucky, a property owner must file a right-to-take challenge within 20 calendar days of being served with the 
summons and petition. After the time of filing the petition, the challenge must be done by way of an answer to the 
petition.10 The answer is strictly limited to the question of the right of the petitioner to condemn the property.  
 
Any answer or other pleading filed by the owner in response to the summons shall be filed on or 
before the twenty (20) days after date of service and shall be confined solely to the question of 
the right of the petitioner to condemn the property sought to be condemned, but without 
                                                                
2 Constitutional Conventions of 1799, 1850, and 1891. Attempts for constitutional conventions failed in 1931, 1947, 
1960, and 1977. The revised 1891 constitution opened a path for constitutional amendments through the state 
legislature, which has been used successfully. 
3 As will be discussed, Kentucky’s highest court has determined that an agency exercising its power of eminent 
domain can neither act in excess of the power it holds nor act arbitrarily. Kentucky case law and statutory revisions 
clarified the criteria. To defeat a right-to-take challenge, evidence must show either fraud, bad faith, or abuse of 
discretion. See e.g., Com., D.O.H. v. Vandertoll, 388 S.W. 2d 358 (Ky. 1964) and KRS §177.081. 
4 Kentucky Constitution, 1891, Amendment 5. 
5 Ky. Const. § 13 
6 United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, Section 1. 
7 Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Vandertoll, 388 S.W. 2d 358 (Ky. 1964). 
8 KRS §416.540. 
9 KRS §416.650. 
10 Many steps that must be taken by the attorney prior to getting to service of process, which impacts the timeline 
for achieving a right of entry. Those steps and how they impact time will be discussed below. There is a case, 
Bluegrass Pipeline Company, LLC v. Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc. 478 S.W.3d 386 (Ky. App. 
2016) Review denied February 10, 2016, which allows for a right-to-take challenge to be filed against a condemnor 
during pre-litigation negotiations. 
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prejudice to the owner’s right to except from the amount of the compensation awarded in the 
manner provided in KRS 416.550 to 416.670.11 
 
Immediately following a revision of Kentucky’s Eminent Domain Act in 1976, a court decision found this requirement 
should be strictly held to: 
 
The condemnee's answer is "confined solely to the question of the right of the petitioner 
to condemn the property..." KRS 416.600 (emphasis added). The statute directs the condemnee to 
raise immediately (if at all) the issues of the right-to-take. If no such answer is filed, the trial court 
must enter an interlocutory judgment which authorizes the taking and grants the right of 
immediate possession upon payment of the commissioners' award. KRS 416.610(2). Any 
exceptions to such interlocutory judgment are to be confined to the amount of the award. KRS 
416.620(1).12 
 
At least one court decision held that a disagreement over a property description is resolved during a case’s 
compensation phase. It is not a right-to-take issue: 
 
Any dispute as to the value of what is actually being taken will be considered at the trial on 
damages. [citation omitted] The interlocutory order and judgment of the trial court simply found 
that the DOT had the right to condemn the property described in the complaint.13 
 
This includes inaccuracies in the amount of property being acquired.14  
 
Arguments regarding access and the resolution of legal arguments are dealt with in the compensation portion of a 
case. As decided in Hamilton v. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways, 799 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1990), neither 
issue can provide a basis for a right-to-take challenge. 
 
The trial court assured the appellants that they would be entitled to make any and all legal 
arguments they wanted on the issue of access in the damages portion of the proceeding and that 
they might "ultimately" succeed in convincing it that CSX's "obligation is greater than it appears." 
However, the trial court determined that there was nothing unreasonable, unfair or oppressive in 
CSX's "approach" to the issue so as to implicate CSX's right to file this action. Clearly, CSX was not 
required to accept the appellants' legal arguments of the extent of its liability in order to be 
allowed to proceed to condemn. See e.g., Coke v. Commonwealth, Dept. Of Finance, Ky., 502 
S.W.2d 57 (1973).15 
 
A Court of Appeals decision later affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a right-to-take challenge can be 
made during pre-condemnation negotiations.16 This was attempted in Collins v. Commonwealth, 324 S.W.2d 406 
(Ky. 1959). The Collins right-to-take challenge took the form of a separate action seeking an injunction against a 
highway project that would convert US 60 to a four-lane highway between Versailles and Frankfort; it was not done 
within a condemnation case. The action was brought before a condemnation proceeding was initiated on behalf of 
all property owners affected by the project. It failed because an aggrieved party can only obtain an injunction (which 
is equitable in nature) if there is no adequate remedy at law and the statute allows for a right-to-take challenge by 
other judicial means.  
 
                                                                
11 KRS §416.600 emphasis and bold added. 
12 Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell Cty., 617 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1981). 
13 Hart County Bank & Trust Co. v. Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways, Unpub. LEXIS 1014, *4 (Ky. App. 2009). 
14 Hamilton v. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways, 799 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1990). 
15 Eaton Asphalt Paving Co. v. CSX Transp., 8 S.W.3d 878, 883-84 (Ky. App. 1999).  
16 Bluegrass Pipeline Company, LLC v. Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc. 478 S.W.3d 386 (Ky. App. 
2016) Review denied February 10, 2016.  
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In 2016, review was denied in Bluegrass Pipeline Company, LLC v. Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, 
Inc. 478 S.W.3d 386 (Ky. App. 2016), which let members of a nonprofit Kentucky Corporation file pre-condemnation 
challenges to the condemnor’s right-to-take: 
 
In the case at hand, Bluegrass is actively negotiating with landowners. The threat of acquiring land 
through eminent domain has a current and material impact on negotiations between Bluegrass 
and landowners. As KURED and the trial court point out, landowners may grant voluntary 
easements over their property because they do not have the means to engage in litigation to 
determine the issue. If the eminent domain issue remains unresolved, it would give Bluegrass an 
unfair advantage during the negotiation process. We find no error on the issue of justiciability.17 
 
To date, Kentucky courts have not issued additional opinions on whether property owners can file pre-condemnation 
right-to-take challenges. 
 
To review, in Kentucky a property owner can submit a right-to-take challenge no later than 20 days after being served 
with the summons. At that time, the challenge must be stated in the answer to the petition. At least one case allows 
for a right-to-take challenge to be made before a condemnation action is filed during the statutorily required 
negotiations. To narrow the issues included in the challenge, attorneys may move to strike an answer based on 
compensation issues disguised as a right-to-take issue. Attorneys can also move to strike a portion of an answer 
when a legally permissible right-to-take challenge is made along with impermissible issues of compensation.  
 
1.2.2 Right-to-Take Decisions Must Be Expedited 
Delays in obtaining right of entry when a right-to-take challenge has been made occur despite both state statute and 
Kentucky case decisions requiring the court to hold an expedited hearing on a right-to-take issue once it is properly 
raised by the property owner. KRS §416.610 states:  
 
If the owner has filed answer or pleading putting in issue the right of the petitioner to condemn 
the property or use and occupation thereof sought to be condemned, the court shall, without 
intervention of jury, proceed forthwith to hear and determine whether or not the petitioner has 
such right. If the court determines that petitioner has such rights, an interlocutory judgment, as 
provided for in subsection (2) of this section, shall be entered.18 
 
The decision in Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell Cty., 617 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1981), lays out in simple terms the 
process under the statutory scheme adopted in 1976: 
 
If, however, the answer referred to in KRS 416.600 has been filed (putting in issue the right-to-
take), the trial court must immediately determine the matter.19 
 
If the court finds the condemnor is authorized to condemn and has not acted arbitrarily, it enters an interlocutory 
order and judgment (IOJ). If there is no appeal from the IOJ, the case proceeds to a determination of compensation. 
The court will dismiss the case if it finds (a) the condemnor lacks the power of eminent domain or (b) exercised that 
power arbitrarily or in bad faith. The condemnor may then (a) correct the problem and refile the case at a later 
time20 and (b) appeal the dismissal.21 Both actions can be done simultaneously.22 
 
In Ky. Utils. Co. v. Brashear, 726 S.W.2d 321, (Ky. App. 1987), the trial court understood the need to provide a speedy 
response to the right-to-take challenge. In this case, the property owners, the Brashears, filed an answer denying 
                                                                
17 Id at 390. 
18 KRS §416.610 
19 Ratliff, supra. at p. 38. Emphasis added. 
20 Golden Foods, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.3d 679 (Ky. App. 2007). 
21 Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell Cty., 617 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1981). 
22 Golden Foods, Inc., supra. 
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the utility company’s right to condemn and requesting a hearing. “The [h]earing was held on May 28, 1981. On that 
same day the court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and interlocutory judgment granted Kentucky Utilities 
easement rights and authorized immediate possession. KRS §416.610(4).”23 It is unusual for a court to issue a 
decision which includes findings of fact and conclusions of law on the same day as a hearing. In this case, the property 
owners argued they did not receive notice the court had done so, and for that reason should be given an extension 
of time in which to file exceptions. The Court of Appeals, in ruling that no time extension should be granted, was 
consistent with the trial court’s understanding that a right-to-take challenge is a matter to be expedited: 
 
In the case at bar, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and interlocutory judgment were entered 
the same day as the hearing from which it resulted. … Also, Kentucky Utilities was granted 
authorization to take immediate possession of the easement. The clerk made notation on the 
judgment that copies were mailed or delivered to the parties' attorneys. It is unclear from the 
record whether the parties' attorneys were present when the judge made his determinations of 
fact and law and entered the judgment. Even assuming arguendo that the landowners' attorneys 
were not present at the judgment nor notified of its entry, they should have made inquiry of the 
progress of the proceedings as KRS 416.610(4) requires the court to "proceed forthwith" to hear 
and determine whether or not the petitioner (Kentucky Utilities) has a right to condemn.24 
 
Hart Cty. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways, No. 2007-CA-002533-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 1014, (Ky. 
App. 2009), dealt with acceptable timelines for sufficient due process with respect to right-to-take challenges. The 
property owner argued they had insufficient time to prepare for the right-to-take hearing. The case was filed on 
August 16, 2007, the Summons was issued on October 9, the Answer filed on October 22, and the right-to-take trial 
held on November 20, 2007. Three months after the petition was filed and less than a month after the right-to-take 
challenge was made, the court conducted a hearing. The appellate court concluded: “The only issue before the trial 
court was the DOT's right to condemn the land described in the complaint. We cannot conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to grant the Bank a continuance.”25 While this decision is unpublished, it still helps 
set the bar for how swiftly right-to-take hearings should be conducted and concluded.  
 
In another unpublished decision, ten cases raised very similar issues, so they were consolidated (treated as one case) 
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Courts often do this for expediency or, the reason is often referred to as 
being in “the interest of judicial economy.” Barone v. Sanitation Dist. No. 126 , was decided in May of 2020 after the 
condemnor provided voluminous discovery. One continuance was granted to the property owners, but even with a 
continuance, only seven months elapsed between the filing of the condemnation petitions and the right-to-take 
hearing. The Court of Appeals noted this timeline was consistent with the economical litigation docket to which the 
case had been assigned.27 Citing Ratliff, the court held there was no reversible error in denying additional 
continuances to the property owners as “…trial courts are required to immediately decide eminent domain 
proceedings. Ratliff, 617 S.W.2d at 38.” 28 
 
Even though Kentucky statutory and case law require expedited hearings when a right-to-take challenge is made, 
delays still exist.  
 
                                                                
23 Brashear, infra., at 322. Emphasis added. 
24 Ky. Utils. Co. v. Brashear, 726 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ky. App. 1987) emphasis added 
25 Hart County Bank & Trust Co. v. Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways, Unpub. LEXIS 1014, (Ky. App. 2009). 
26 Barone v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2016-CA-001711-MR, 2016-CA-001712-MR, 2016-CA-001713-MR, 2016-CA-
001714-MR, 2016-CA-001715-MR, 2016-CA-001716-MR, 2016-CA-001717-MR, 2016-CA-001718-MR, 2016-CA-
001733-MR, 2016-CA-001734-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 32, (Ky. App. 2020).  
27 See Ky. CR Rule 89 
28 Barone at 40-41. 
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1.2.3 Constitutional Right to One Appeal  
Prior to 1976, KRS §177.080 et. seq. contained eminent domain law. Under this statute, when right-to-take was at 
issue and the owner would be irreparably injured by an immediate loss of possession, they could ask for and were 
entitled to a temporary injunction at any time after an appeal to the circuit court was perfected.29 — “In 1976, the 
Kentucky General Assembly enacted a new condemnation statute, the Kentucky Eminent Domain Act. KRS §416.540-
416.680. The purpose of the act was to set up a new and uniform condemnation procedure.”30  
 
In Ratliff the property owner wanted to appeal a trial court’s right-to-take decision. Previous eminent domain 
decisions held there was no right to an appeal.31 Ratliff challenged the constitutionality of the current statute based 
a newly amended section of the Kentucky Constitution which gave the right to one appeal in all civil and criminal 
cases (Ky. Const. §115). The amendment took effect January 1, 1976, shortly before the new eminent domain statute 
was passed. The new statute does not contain any specific “unequivocal statutory provision that permits an 
immediate appeal from the trial court's ruling.”32 Because courts must interpret a statue in a way that upholds its 
constitutionality, and Ky. Const. §115 was in effect when the new eminent domain act was drafted, the Ratliff 
decision observed “the provisions of KRS §416.610(4) referring to an interlocutory judgment …, allows an 
immediate, expedited appeal, by the condemnee of the question of the condemnor's right-to-take. There is no doubt 
but that a losing condemnor has this right also.”33 Once an interlocutory judgment has been entered, the appeal 
time is 30 days and cannot be extended.34 
 
The Ratliff decision noted that if the condemnor was given the right of immediate possession, but that decision was 
later overturned on appeal, the property owner could never be made whole again as the damage to the property 
would already be done. Likewise, the court was aware that the process of appealing this decision puts the 
condemnor in limbo. The ruling specified both the trial court hearing and the appeal should be “immediate and 
expedited.”35 The question of whether entry upon the land sought for condemnation can proceed during the appeal 
is discussed later. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
Kentucky constitutional and statutory law requires that a fair process be in place to let a property owner challenge 
a condemnor’s right to acquire private property, including a right to appeal the initial decision. Property acquired by 
a condemnor must be for public use, and property owners have the right to an immediate and expedited hearing on 
right-to-take. Two of these requirements stand regardless of statutory revisions: the requirement that property must 
be needed (i.e., not arbitrary) for public use, and the right to one appeal. These requirements will remain in place 
unless the Kentucky and US Constitutions are amended. The right to an expedited hearing is granted by statute and 
subject to statutory revisions. 
  
                                                                
29 Stillpass v. Kenton Cty. Ariport Bd., Inc., 403 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. 1966). 
30 Ratliff at 38. 
31 Cartmell v. Urban Renewal & Cmty. Dev. Agency, 430 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. 1968), an urban renewal eminent domain 
case. 
32 Ratliff at 39. 
33 Id., emphasis added 
34 Hagg v. Ky. Utils. Co., 660 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. App. 1983) 
35 Ratliff at 39. 
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Chapter 2 Survey of State Transportation Agencies  
 
In 2020, we distributed a national survey on right-to-take issues confronting departments of transportation (DOTs). 
Eighteen attorneys from 14 states submitted responses — 14 came from state attorneys and 4 from private firms 
representing a state agency. Respondents had an average experience of 18 years litigating condemnation cases, with 
a range of 6 to 33 years. Appendix A provides all questions and full sets of survey responses.  
 
2.1 Findings of the 2020 National Survey 
Over the past three years, respondents reported fielding between 0 and 15 right-to-take challenges (mean = 2.28 
challenges). Sixty percent of the attorneys said the number of right-to-take challenges is remaining stable, while 22% 
said the numbers are increasing and 11% felt frequencies are declining. The most often-cited reason for challenges 
was an allegation of inadequate compensation (n = 7), followed by objections to design plans (n = 4) an unfair 
process, bad faith negotiations, and property owners viewing the taking as unnecessary (n = 3). Insufficient 
environmental review, a lack of fairness in negotiations, lack of knowledge about the law, and a lack of public 
purpose were mentioned twice. Issues listed once included a failure to follow the law on negotiations, damage to 
access, incomplete design, poor treatment by the agency, an inability to find all the property owners, anti-
government sentiment, a desire to keep the property, a violation of religious rights, an arbitrary and capricious 
decision to take the property, and a desire to use the challenge as leverage in litigation.  
 
Sixty-five percent of respondents observed that the length of time between when a challenge is made and when the 
right of entry is obtained is six months or less. Twenty-nine percent of participants said the process lasts between 
six months and one year. Six percent reported that obtaining right of entry takes between 1.5 and 2 years after a 
challenge is made. One respondent, whose state has litigated only one challenge in the past three years, reported 
the case lasting over three years. The most common reasons for delay are court schedules and the collection and 
distribution of discovery materials. Other explanations cited include appeal time and Other (difficulty obtaining 
service, factual investigation of witnesses, and preparing exhibits). In terms of resolving right-to-take challenges, the 
most common tactics are monetary settlement and the category Other (29% for each). Encompassed in the category 
Other are motion practice; negotiations; and a variety of accommodations (letting the owner remain on the property 
for a certain period, modification of construction staging, access, or parking issues). Plan revisions and trials are the 
third most frequently used tools (21% for both). Common tools for expediting the process include a rocket docket 
(50%), plan revisions (33%), and Other (17%). Here, Other includes excluding issues about compensation from the 
right-to-take challenge and dismissing the petition and refiling (this requires payment of accrued attorney’s fees). 
Mediation is also used to expedite the process but ranked within the second most frequent category of tools at 42%. 
Respondents said very few right-to-take challenges are resolved in favor of property owners (10% or less).  
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Chapter 3 Current Practice and Process in Preventing & Resolving Right-to-Take Challenges in 
Kentucky 
 
3.1 Pre-Condemnation Requirements 
A condemnor36 is a person or entity that seizes real and/or personal property via eminent domain.37 Before a 
condemnation action is filed, the condemnor must attempt to reach an agreement with a property owner. All 
negotiations should be carefully documented. Negotiations are unnecessary when the owner (a) is unknown, (b) 
under [legal] disability38 (in which case the guardian should be approached to negotiate), (c) or cannot be found 
after reasonable efforts are made.39 In addition, the condemnor must acquire the property for a public use.40 A 
document, such as an Official Order authorizing the project demonstrates the public-use requirement and should be 
referenced in the petition.41 In preparing to condemn property, the condemnor or its agents have authority to enter 
the property to conduct studies, surveys, tests, soundings, and appraisals. But the owner must be notified at least 
10 days prior to entry.42  
 
To properly file a condemnation action, an attorney must prepare a packet of documents. Attorneys submit the 
following materials to the circuit court clerk when they file a condemnation action:  
 
• Original petition  
• Original full-sized plan sheets  
o One for the court file, one for use by commissioners, and one for the owner or their attorney of record  
• A copy of the petition and an attached small size plan sheet(s) as an exhibit for every named defendant43  
• A copy to obtain a stamp “filed” for the attorney’s record  
• An Order to Appoint Commissioners  
• Two blank Reports of Commissioners  
o One for the record, one for the commissioners to use when executing their duties  
• Order to Pay Commissioners  
• Three summons for each defendant  
o One for the attorney to keep stamped ‘tendered,’ one for delivery to the defendant, and one for the 
sheriff to return to the clerk after service is perfected  
 
The attorney should also file a Notice of Lis Pendens with the county clerk immediately after filing the petition and 
accompanying documents. The attorney representing the condemnor must submit the necessary filing fee before 
                                                                
36 KRS §416.540 (2) 
37 KRS §416.540 (8) 
38 The negotiator should not attempt to make a psychological or medical decision about an owner’s ability to 
negotiate, even if the circumstances seem obvious. If the negotiator questions an owners’ ability to comprehend the 
agreement, they should seek legal advice before proceeding. Nor should the negotiator assume a family member 
can speak on behalf of that person. Legally, any person 18 years of age or older has the sole authority to either bind 
themselves to a contract or to appoint for themselves a power of attorney who can sign for them. This is the legal 
reality unless a person is determined to be unable to enter into contracts by the district court and has had a guardian 
appointed to act in their behalf pursuant to KRS § 387.500-387.800, Guardianship and Conservatorship for Disabled 
Persons. 
39 KRS §416.550 
40 KRS §416.540 (1) and (5) and Ratliff at 38. 
41 It may save time and argument, and perhaps deter right-to-take challenges if the attorney attaches the official 
order for the project as Exhibit B to the petition. 
42 KRS §416.560 (4). 
43 While failure to attach an exhibit is not fatal to the condemnor, it provides a controversy since the petition states 
there is an exhibit attached to the petition. See McGehee v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-001568-MR, 2010 Ky. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 128 (Ky. App. 2010). 
 
 
KTC Research Report Understanding and Efficiently Managing Right-to-Take Challenges in Kentucky 10 
the circuit court clerk will allow the case to be filed.44 Failure to provide any of these items may delay obtaining right 
of entry.  
 
“A petition seeking condemnation is required to contain those allegations necessary to show that the petitioner is 
entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain. KRS §416.570(1).”45 A petition filed to initiate condemnation 
proceedings must be verified.46 Typically, this is done by the attorney attesting to its veracity. Some attorneys 
recommend that an engineer or right-of-way agent verify its contents. The engineer can confirm the property 
description is accurate, avoiding future delay. The petition must allege facts sufficient to show that (a) the entity has 
condemnation powers, (b) the property is needed for public use, and (c) an attempt to negotiate with the owner 
was unsuccessful.47 The petition must also give a particular description of the property and its current use.48 The 
petition must also request that the court appoint commissioners to determine the amount of compensation the 
owner of the property is entitled to.49  
 
Omitting any of the requirements when drafting condemnation petitions and filing condemnation cases will create 
a flaw in the pleading, opening an opportunity for a challenge, and delay moving the case toward a right of entry. 
 
3.1.1 Pre-Filing Delays & Prevention of Right-to-take Challenges 
The statutory requirement for a particular description typically does not create a problem. However, lacking a final 
or accurate description of the taking when the appraisal is completed or when the petition is prepared causes delays. 
If a discrepancy is discovered after the appraisal is completed an appraisal update is necessary. If a discrepancy is 
discovered after a petition is filed, an Amended Petition must be filed. If a description changes occur after the 
Commissioners’ Report is filed, the commissioners must reconvene and determine a new value.50 If less property is 
needed, the property owner may agree to forego reappointment of the commissioners to determine a new 
Commissioners’ Award. Nonetheless, the petition and other pleadings must be revised to reflect the new description 
(a step which takes additional time). 
 
Flawed title reports can result in the need to add parties after negotiations occur and is potentially grounds for a 
right-to-take challenge based on failing to negotiate with all owners before filing the condemnation suit. This 
challenge is not insurmountable if it was not done in bad faith, but it does delay the process.  
 
A tool that could be used during this negotiation phase is a right of entry agreement. These agreements differ from 
an Agreed IOJ as they grant right of entry prior to filing the action while requiring the case be filed within a specific 
timeframe. Often, the right of entry agreement includes a provision for waiving formal service or process and can 
provide for posting the state’s offer in lieu of the Commissioners’ Award. This dramatically reduces the timeframe 
for right of entry because entry is immediate, and the risk of a right-to-take challenge is eliminated. These 
agreements also dispense with the time needed for service of process and/or the time needed for the commissioners 
to file a report.  
 
In summary, failing to provide the appraiser with an accurate property description prior to the property appraisal 
and failing to provide the attorney an accurate description of the taking prior to suit being filed can create facts that 
may result in a right-to-take challenge. Another error or omission that requires time to correct is a lack of complete 
information on title and owners. Agreed IOJs and right of entry agreements are two valuable methods for reducing 
delay.  
 
                                                                
44 KRS §416.560 (3) and Ky. CR Rule 3.02. 
45 Ratliff at 38. 
46 KRS §416.570 
47 KRS §416.570 (1) 
48 KRS §416.570 (2) 
49 KRS §416.570 (3) 
50 Charles Hamilton, Executor of the Estate of Ben Frank Robards v. Com., D.O.H., 799 S.W.2d 39, (Ky. 1990). 
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3.2 Post-Filing Delays Prior to a Right-to-take Challenge 
The first step after filing a condemnation action is the appointment of commissioners.51 The judge is statutorily 
responsible for this appointment, but the clerk can be directed to fill in the names on the Order and contact each 
commissioner. This is an area of potential delay as some counties delay the appointment or reports are not filed in 
a timely manner. Commissioners must be sworn before providing their service and have 15 calendar days from the 
date of their appointment to return a completed Report of Commissioners to the clerk.52 If there is a mathematical 
or other error in the report, the attorney requests that the Court to reconvene the commissioners to make 
corrections. They must then file an Amended Commissioners’ Report — which is time-consuming.  
 
After the Commissioners’ Report is filed, the clerk issues summons to each named defendant(s). The summons must 
include the amount of the Commissioners’ Award.53 A summons can be served by certified mail. For Kentucky 
residents it is served by sheriffs, coroners, jailers, or constables in the county where the person resides.54 These 
individuals can also serve out-of-state defendants physically present in Kentucky.55  
 
Out-of-state defendants or defendants whose location is unknown may alternatively be served by appointment of a 
warning order attorney who must attempt to locate and communicate with the defendant.56 The duly appointed 
warning order attorney may also publish a notice of the action in a paper servicing the last known location of the 
defendant or the property’s location. The warning order attorney has 50 days from the date of their appointment in 
which to file a report.57 Defendants are considered constructively served 30 days after the warning order attorney’s 
report is filed.58 Out-of-state defendants may also be served by certified mail or personal delivery of a copy of the 
summons and petition by a person over 18 years of age. Such service without an appearance shall not authorize a 
personal judgment, but for all other purposes the person summoned shall be before the courts as in other cases of 
personal service.59 The rules allow for attempts at both constructive and personal service.60  
 
Because delays happen, no set timetable has been established to complete service of process. Once a party is served, 
defendants have 20 calendar days to file an Answer.61 After a case is filed, any challenge to the right-to-take must 
be included in the Answer.62 
                                                                
51 KRS §416.580 (1). 
52 Id. 
53 KRS §416.590. 
54 Ky. CR Rule 4.01 and KRS §454.140, and KRS §454.210. 
55 KRS § 454.210 (2) (a) 6. and (3) (a) 2. 
56 According to Ky. CR 4.06 this requires an affidavit from the attorney requesting an appointment of a warning order 
attorney. It is often included in the condemnation petition, in which case verification that the property owner cannot 
be found will necessarily be a person with knowledge of the location or the unsuccessful steps taken in an attempt 
to locate the defendant, usually the right-of-way agent.  
57 See CR 4.07. 
58 Ky. CR 4.08. 
59 Ky. CR 4.04. 
60 Ky. CR 4.09 
61 Ky. CR 4.02 
62 KRS §416.600, KRS §416.610 (4) 
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After a condemnation action is filed, delays may occur at several junctures, some of which lie beyond the litigating 
attorney’s influence. There are no details on the length of and/or reasons for delays prompted by the appointment 
of commissioners, return of Commissioners’ Reports, and service of process. Nor is it clear what the most efficient 
method is for obtaining service of process on both in-state and out-of-state defendants.  
 
3.3 Litigation Delays During a Right-to-take Challenge 
Once a right-to-take challenge is raised, the parties begin discovery and identify evidence to present at the hearing, 
including documents and witnesses. Typically, both parties make a request to produce documents. Materials 
contained in the response to this request are commonly used as evidence. Unlike an open records request, which is 
limited to documents in the public domain and governed by statute, a request to produce documents can include 
any relevant information so long as it is not protected by executive, attorney-client, work product, or other 
privilege.63 These documents pertain to project engineering, planning, right of way, and other areas. Materials 
include electronically generated or stored documents, printed documents, handwritten notes, calendars, phone 
messages, e-mails, drafts, and documents, and can be time consuming to collect. In addition to a request for 
documents, a Request for Answers to Interrogatories is a common tool in litigating right-to-take challenges. This is 
a set of questions asked of the opposing party to determine relevant facts.64 Upon receipt of a Request for 
Production of Documents or Interrogatories, a party has a minimum of 30 days to respond.65 If the goal is an 
expedited process, it is imperative to serve discovery requests as quickly as possible and to be prepared to deliver 
documents and answers quickly. A less commonly used, but perhaps more effective tool is the deposition of witness 
that may be called at the hearing.66 Names of witnesses are usually discovered when documents are received and 
answers are delivered. Scheduling a time when the parties, their counsel, and the potential witness are available can 
cause delay.  
 
Because court scheduling and obtaining a ruling after a hearing are frequent causes of delay, a best practice is to 
request a hearing date at the onset and work a discovery schedule back from that date. The request for the hearing 
date can include a request for an expedited hearing date. This may reduce the time it takes to achieve a resolution.  
 
Experience litigating right-to-take challenges typically increases an attorney’s ability to move cases forward. Training 
new attorneys could play a critical role in bringing a right-to-take challenges to a quick conclusion. 
 
To review, one of the most common reasons for delayed right-to-take litigation is challenges associated with finding 
and efficiently collecting relevant documents for discovery. Discovery timelines are set out in the Ky. CRs and play a 
role in the right-to-take litigation timeline. The second most common cause of delay is court scheduling and judicial 
response time. 
 
                                                                
63 Ky. CR 34. 
64 Ky. CR 33. 
65 Ky. CR 33.01 and 34.02. 
66 Ky. CR 30. 
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Figure 3.2 Steps Involved in a Right-to-Take Challenge 
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3.4 Appellate Delays 
A speedy appeals process was recognized in both the Ratliff and the Collins cases. When the Collins court held that 
an injunction was not available because an adequate statutory remedy existed, the court noted: “It is essential, 
however, in order to defeat a suit for injunction on the ground of the existence of a statutory remedy, that the 
remedy so provided be speedy, adequate, and complete."67 However, the decision went on to caution: 
 
The remedy provided by statute is detailed from the summons, through judgment, to final appeal 
in this Court. If pursued it could and would fully and completely determine the issue of necessity 
raised in this action and is therefore adequate. The statutory remedy is available from the time of 
summons and, on its face, is sufficiently speedy. It is presumed that the trial judges will perform 
their duties and expedite business to meet the exigencies of matters pending. With this kind of 
action on the part of the court together with the prompt action of the landowner when the remedy 
becomes available to him, there can be little doubt that the statutory remedy is full, speedy, 
complete and adequate. However, should the wheels of justice turn too slowly to preserve the 
statutes quo, the owner, once having invoked the statutory remedy, may then ask for such 
equitable action as is necessary to preserve the rights intended to be preserved under the statute.68 
 
This case was decided under an older eminent domain statute that has since been repealed and replaced. Even so, 
it can be important to show this history of the issue if arguing for a speedy resolution of a right-to-take issue.  
 
The Ratliff decision also insisted that the trial court and appellate court are obligated to expedite the process in 
condemnation cases:  
 
We believe that the provisions of KRS 416.610(4) referring to an interlocutory judgment because 
of the above reason, allows an immediate, expedited appeal, by the condemnee of the question 
of the condemnor's right-to-take. There is no doubt but that a losing condemnor has this right 
also.69 
 
In review, the Kentucky Supreme Court has affirmed the right to an expedited appeal — which right is granted by 
implication in the state’s Eminent Domain Act.  
  
                                                                
67 Collins v. Commonwealth, 324 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky. 1959) emphasis added. 
68 Id. emphasis added. 
69 Ratliff, supra. At 39. 
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Chapter 4 Right-to-take Challenges and the Courts 
 
4.1 Who Decides a Right-to-Take Challenge? 
Once a right-to-take challenge is made, the condemnor has a right to an expedited hearing. As early as 1933 the 
Kentucky’s highest Court ruled those decisions about whether a condemnor had met the requirements necessary to 
exercise the power of eminent domain is a question of law and not of fact.70 Because juries adjudicate the accuracy 
of facts and judges resolve questions of law, the right of the condemnor to take property over the objection of the 
constitutionally protected person is an issue for a judge, not a jury.71 
 
4.2 The Property Owner Must Prove the Taking was Arbitrary, done in Bad Faith, or an Abuse of Discretion 
While KRS §416.540 et. seq. sets forth the procedure for condemnation cases, other statutes confer an agency’s 
eminent domain authority. For example, KRS §177.081 confers to KYTC its eminent domain authority: 
 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Highways, when it has, by official order, 
designated the route, location, or relocation of a highway, limited access highway, bridge, roadside 
park, borrow-pit, quarry, garage, or other property or structure deemed necessary for the 
construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of an adequate system of highways, may, if unable 
to contract or agree with the owner or owners thereof, condemn the lands or material, or the use 
and occupancy of the lands designated as necessary. … The official order of the Department of 
Highways shall be conclusive of the public use of the condemned property and the condemnor’s 
decision as to the necessity for taking the property will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, 
bad faith, or abuse of discretion (emphasis added).72  
 
To prevail in a right-to-take challenge, a condemnor must meet a two-pronged test of necessity and public purpose 
(i.e., the property is desired for public use and will be reasonably necessary for that use).73 Taking cannot be done 
arbitrarily (Ky. Const. § 2).74 
 
4.2.1 What Counts as Arbitrariness and Abuse of Discretion? 
The Kentucky and United States Constitutions have been interpreted as preventing the government from arbitrarily 
exercising power. Ky. Const. §13 states that property cannot be taken by the government without the consent of a 
person’s representatives. A good example of how this is accomplished is found in KYTC’s process of project selection. 
  
Kentucky road plans are reviewed by the state legislature and particular projects are included in a six-year highway 
plan. The executive branch then takes identified projects and develops plans for each. Prior to project initiation, the 
KYTC Secretary signs an official order that directs construction to proceed according to the plans. If the legislative 
branch determines a project is needed for public use, the executive branch is not acting arbitrarily when it develops 
a road plan to construct that project — it is fulfilling a legislative mandate. 
 
If a condemnor has an official document specifying that property is needed for a for a public road project, 
condemnation of property needed for the project is not arbitrary. This position was tested in Commonwealth Transp. 
Cabinet Dep't of Highways v. Taub, 766 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1988), which involved acquiring land for a four-lane road that 
would also provide access to a proposed automotive plant. The trial court ruled in favor of KYTC on a right-to-take 
challenge. A divided Court of Appeals panel reversed this decision, finding that the Cabinet had not exercised the 
discretion entrusted to it by the General Assembly and the Official Order. The Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated 
                                                                
70 Davidson v. Com., State Highways Commission, 61 S.W. 2d 34, 36 (Ky. 1933). 
71 See Duerson v. East Kentucky Power Co-op, 843 S.W. 2d 340, 344 (Ky. App. 1992) and Commonwealth v. Cooksey, 
948 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. App. 1997). 
72 KRS §177.081(1) 
73 Proffitt v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 850 S.W.2d 852, 852 and 854 (Ky. 1993). 
74 Id. 
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the trial court’s decision, holding that KYTC has broad discretion to determine necessity for acquiring land to build 
highways. 
 
In their original conception, highway projects authorized by the legislative branch are presumed not to be arbitrary, 
and the property owner is saddled with the burden of overcoming that presumption. What facts will overcome this 
presumption? 
 
According to case law, abuse of discretion does not mean a property owner can dictate how construction should be 
completed.  
 
It, therefore, not being disputed that the land sought to be appropriated for borrow pits is 
necessary and requisite for the construction of a levee approach to the contemplated bridge and 
the authorized public agency (the state highway commission) having adopted that plan of 
approach, there exists no right in defendants to defeat the purpose of the condemnation by 
showing that other engineering devices might have been employed that would not have required 
the taking of their land, although it be one vastly more expensive, and which was not approved by 
the proper public agency as the most appropriate and wiser plan. We therefore conclude that this 
argument is also without merit.75  
 
The Davidson v. Com., State Highways Commission, 61 S.W. 2d 34, 36 (Ky. 1933) judgment held that decisions about 
such matters are not reviewable by courts as such details are political — not judicial — decisions.76 The decision in 
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Burchett, 367 S.W.2d 262, (Ky. 1963) emphasized that the details of road 
construction are not a question for the courts to determine and not a legitimate basis for a right-to-take challenge. 
At issue was the Highway Department acquiring land for waste disposal. Once the waste was deposited, the land 
surface would be even with the new highway and its value would increase. The property owners offered, at no cost 
to the public, temporary use of a nearby ravine as an alternative. Both locations were suitable for the intended 
purpose. In its decision, the court ruled: “The judicial power of government should not be invoked against the 
discretion of an agency of the executive branch in determining what is in the public interest, including what particular 
property is needed in connection with a valid public project, unless there is such a clear and gross abuse of that 
discretion as to offend the guaranty of Const. §2 against the exercise of arbitrary power.”77 In denying a right-to-
take challenge the court stated: 
 
It makes no difference that the department could have chosen another location or another plan 
for waste disposal. Probably any highway could be routed some other way. The state cannot 
reasonably be compelled to submit its administrative judgments to battle in every county 
courthouse. Cf. Davidson v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Highway Commission, 1933, 249 Ky. 568, 
61 S.W.2d 34, 37. And if it be conceded that when the immediate purpose of the acquisition has 
been completed the state will be the owner of a valuable piece of property, so what? Is long-range 
planning by a governmental agency charged with the expenditure of astronomical sums of money 
to be regarded as against the public interest? Is the possibility that it may contemplate getting 
further use out of the property evidence of bad faith? On the question of "public necessity," is the 
highway department to be denied the exercise of prudence and foresight? Surely the answer is 
self-evident.78  
 
The next year the court was asked to consider two different bases for a right-to-take challenge: bad faith negotiations 
and no necessity for the taking.  
 
                                                                
75 Davidson v. Commonwealth, 61 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Ky. 1933). 
76 Id. 
77 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Burchett, 367 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Ky. 1963). 
78 Id. 
 
KTC Research Report Understanding and Efficiently Managing Right-to-Take Challenges in Kentucky 18 
In Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Vandertoll, 388 S.W. 2d 358 (Ky. 1964) condemnation proceedings began 
pursuant to a work order that stated, “the interest of the public will be best served by the acquisition of the entire 
lot or tract.” Further, it noted the tract would be used for the highway and other necessary auxiliary facilities, 
including but not limited to connecting and frontage roads, elevation of adjustments, road crossings by overpass or 
underpass, drainage installation and roadside parks.79 The taking of property unneeded for the roadway sparked a 
right-to-take challenge in addition to allegations of bad faith negotiations (based on the offer amount). The property 
owners knew of the road plans when they bought the property. The Department of Highways offered $135,000 for 
the entire tract (the purchase price paid two months before), while the property owners countered with a $260,000 
offer to sell.80 The Vandertoll decision held that there must be proof of fraud, bad faith, and abuse of discretion. 
Unless the condemning authority acted arbitrarily or in excess of its power, the judiciary cannot review the 
condemnor’s discretion: 
 
… the judicial branch of government may not be called upon to question the discretionary power 
of an agency of the executive branch in order to determine what is in the public interest, including 
what particular property is needed in connection with a valid public project, unless there has been 
such a clear and gross abuse of discretion as to violate Section 2 of the Constitution of Kentucky, 
which section is a guaranty against the exercise of arbitrary power. In the case at hand, appellees 
failed to establish even a scintilla of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion upon the part of 
appellant in its proceeding to condemn appellees' tract of land.81 
 
In 1972 the Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that if an official order had not been entered designating a parcel 
as needed for a highway project, any action to condemn it is arbitrary. Only the Commissioner has the authority to 
make such a determination. It cannot be made at the engineering level:  
 
We recognize the necessity to be able to make adjustments in plans, as they relate to the details 
of construction, but we cannot accept the proposition that land not officially designated for 
condemnation can be condemned simply on the basis of decisions at the engineering level. Nor 
are we convinced that it is administratively unreasonable to require that the official order be 
changed when a change in the plans calls for condemnation of land other than that designated in 
the original order.82  
 
In Proffitt v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, 850 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1993) a property owner 
argued that failing to consider environmental concerns was tantamount to acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed, noting there was no such duty articulated by the Kentucky 
Constitution or Kentucky statutes. Rather, the duty to consider environmental impacts is imposed by federal law. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court to let the condemnation proceed.  
 
Consistent with Proffitt v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Metro. Sewer Dist., the Court of Appeals held that a failure to 
strictly comply with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act does not negate a 
state agency’s right to condemn. However, the opinion cautioned: 
[N]o authority has been cited for refusing the State its sovereign power of eminent domain 
because it has not complied with a federal statute or regulation limiting the conditions upon which 
federal funds will be granted to States. Read in context, the statute quoted above recites one of 
the conditions upon which federal funds are to be granted to states on particular highway projects. 
If a state does not see fit to comply with this condition, its right to federal funds may be questioned, 
                                                                
79 See Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Vandertoll, 388 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Ky. 1964). 
80 See Id. at 359. 
81 Vandertoll at 359-360. 
82 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Salmon Corp., 489 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. 1972). 
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but its right to proceed within its own borders under its own laws without federal funding is not 
impaired by the above statute. 
The enforcement of [the federal statute] is not the responsibility of a state court in eminent 
domain proceedings, but rather that of federal agencies disbursing federal funds and, if necessary, 
that of the federal courts by injunctive control of such agencies.83 
4.2.1.1 Abuse of Discretion Due to Lack of Public Use 
Eleven years after Burchett Kentucky’s highest court (at that time the Court of Appeals) held that if land is not 
acquired for public use, the decision concerning acquisition was one of individual preference or convenience (i.e., 
arbitrary). Coke v. Com., Department of Finance, 502 S.W. 2d 57 (Ky. 1974) dealt with the Kentucky Mansion 
Preservation Foundation, Inc., a private non-profit organization raising funds to help the Department of Finance 
acquire property. There was evidence that the foundation would be used to help restore and maintain the property, 
and that it might even be given some management functions. This argument failed. In explaining their decision, the 
court observed:  
 
The evidence did not establish, however, that the ownership of the property would not be retained 
by the state or that the property would not retain its status as a state park or shrine. The fact that 
the foundation might be given some management functions does not mean that the property will 
not be devoted to state use, any more than is the case where facilities in a public park are leased 
or a contract is made with a private company to operate a restaurant in a state office building.84 
 
Perhaps the strongest language written on the topic of public use is found in the decision for Miles v. Dawson, 830 
S.W. 2d 368 (Ky. 1991). The case focused on a 15-acre tract purchased via condemnation to widen the outer loop of 
I-65. After title was conveyed, the state’s plans changed and only 69% of the condemned acreage was used for the 
construction project, leaving almost five acres unused for the originally contemplated public purpose. Five years 
later, the property owner requested the state let her repurchase the unused portion pursuant to K.R.S. § 416.670. 
The state intended to convey the unused portion to a church as part of an agreed settlement in another 
condemnation action. The property owner brought an action for a declaration of rights, and the circuit court 
dismissed her case. The Supreme Court held: 
 
The power to condemn property is an awesome power. City of Owensboro v. McCormick, Ky., 581 
S.W.2d 3, 5 (1979) stated in part: 
 
Naked and unconstitutional governmental power to compel a citizen to surrender his productive 
and attractive property to another citizen who will use it predominantly for his own private profit 
just because such alternative private use is thought to be preferable in the subjective notion of the 
governmental authorities is repugnant to our constitution whether they be cast in a fundamental 
fairness component of due process or in the prohibition against the exercise of arbitrary power. 
 
Here the State stipulated that 30 percent of the condemned property was not needed. No further 
public use as originally contemplated by the State was undertaken, and the State attempted to 
transpose a broad public necessity argument to support its transfer of the property to another 
private party, the church. The denial of the repurchase request by Miles was based entirely on the 
theory of convenience to the State in settling other litigation with Evangel. It has been previously 
noted by this Court that mere convenience is not a sufficient justification for the condemning 
                                                                
83 Kuchle Realty Co., LLC v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.3d 95, 101-02 (Ky. App. 2018) citing Cty. Highway Comm'n, 61 
Tenn.App. at 304-05, 454 S.W.2d at 129. 
84 Coke v. Com., Department of Finance, 502 S.W. 2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1974). 
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authority to act as a land broker for private interests. Cf. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transportation 
v. Knierem, Ky., 707 S.W.2d 340 (1986).85 
 
In denying the right to condemn, the Supreme Court found that the Department of Highways was attempting to use 
the undeveloped tract as an object of barter because it helped settle other litigation involving the project. This was 
not a proper public use.  
 
A public use argument was also proffered in God’s Center v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 125 S.W. 
3d 295, (Ky. App. 2002). The challenge was unsuccessful. God’s Center challenged the condemnation proceeding 
initiated by the Lexington Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG), arguing that LFUCG’s intended acquisition 
was for private use. A private non-profit pursued the involvement of LFUCG for restoring and using the Lyric Theatre 
as a cultural center. God’s Center asserted that the LFUCG’s stated public purpose of historic preservation and use 
of the building as a cultural center could be accomplished without title ownership (e.g., through granting a historic 
easement and God’s Center’s willingness to allow other groups to use the building). In keeping with prior decisions, 
the opinion cautioned: 
 
The condemnor’s decision on the amount of land to be condemned will be disturbed only if it is 
unreasonable in relation to the public interest or welfare involved and the condemnor may 
consider the future, as well as the present, needs for the taking.86  
 
The decision observed that the trial court found that God’s Center had failed to produce any evidence beyond 
speculation that the LFUCG intended to involve the Lyric Foundation/Second District Retirees in operating or 
managing a restored Lyric Theatre. The trial court also found that God’s Center failed to produce evidence that 
LFUCG intended to convey ownership of the Lyric Theatre to a private entity. Instead, LFUCG sought input from the 
community by holding several open community meetings in addition to the meetings with the Lyric Foundation. The 
decision noted, “While the goals and function of God’s Center may be laudable, it is not unreasonable for the LFUCG 
to seek the ability to control the Lyric Theatre for a more diverse, broad-based public use free from potential 
repeated conflicts that could arise from the need to gain God’s Center’s approval.”87 
 
4.2.1.2 Public Necessity versus Public Use 
Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1964) presents an early example of how courts approach the analysis 
of arbitrary power. The case dealt with taking a landowner’s property to build an access road to another person’s 
property. The court reasoned: 
 
Any public way naturally confers a special benefit on those persons whose property adjoins it. All 
roads terminate somewhere. Dead end streets or highways inevitably and particularly subserve 
the private interests of the last property owner on the line. Yet the public has an interest in 
reaching other members thereof. As a practical matter, the right of condemnation for highway 
purposes could not be made to depend upon the predominance of the public interest over private 
benefit. This is too fine a line even for legal draftsmanship. If this consideration were a determining 
factor, the condemnor would endlessly be forced to "battle in every county courthouse", See 
Commonwealth v. Burchett, Ky., 367 S.W.2d 262, 266. The accepted test is whether the roadway 
is under the control of public authorities and is open to public use, without regard to private 
interest or advantage.88 
 
The Sturgill decision identified several parts of a “comprehensive and complex highway construction plan” believed 
to be outside the purview of judicial review. For example, “[p]roblems of necessity, proper design, best utilization of 
                                                                
85 Miles v. Dawson, 830 S.W. 2d 368, 370 (Ky. 1991). 
86 See God's Ctr. Found. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 125 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Ky. App. 2002).  
87 Id. at 302-303. 
88 Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1964), but see Com., D.O.T., v. Knieriem, 707 S.W. 2d 340, (Ky. 1986). 
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adjoining properties, convenience to the public, saving of expense, and promotion of traffic safety are matters which 
must be left to the discretion of the highway authorities. [S]pecific details of the plan cannot be called in question, 
from the standpoint of necessity or public use, except, upon a showing of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion.”89 
Many of those remain outside the boundaries of judicial review. Interpretation of cases like this has evolved. Sturgill 
is consistent with Pike Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Ford, 279 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Ky. 1955) which held that “…courts will not 
interfere with the proposed plans unless there is positive proof of fraud, collusion or a clear abuse of discretion. The 
obligation of locating school sites rests with the County Board of Education. It is not for the courts to say whether 
the Board has acted wisely or unwisely in determining where the school should be located. The only question for 
the courts' determination is whether the Board is exceeding its authority or is acting arbitrarily." 90 
 
City of Bowling Green v. Cooksey, 858 S.W. 2d 190 (Ky. App. 1992) offers a more recent example of an arbitrary 
decision based on public use. The decision ultimately went against the condemnor. The case dealt with the Airport 
Board attempting to condemn property “to establish a safety zone, among other public purposes and uses.” 
Evidence revealed that land would be used solely for a buffer zone with no current or future proposed structures 
located within property boundaries. The property owner offered to restrict his land to agricultural use, give the 
airport a noise easement and/or an easement prohibiting trees, residential development, and the erection of any 
structures on the property up to the airport’s building restriction line. The Airport Board, in turn, offered to lease 
the property back to the property owner with the same restrictions after it acquired a fee simple title. Recall that 
Burchett included a caveat holding that the judiciary would not review the discretionary power of an agency “… 
unless there has been such a clear and gross abuse of discretion as to violate Section 2 of the Constitution of 
Kentucky.” This case presented an example of the situation Burchett warned against. The trial court distinguished 
between the concept of necessity, which is determined by the legislature, and public use, which is determined by 
the courts. The Court of Appeals denied the condemnation finding which held there was no legitimate public purpose 
in acquiring the land. In denying the Airport Board’s right to condemn the court noted: 
 
Under KRS 416.550 the condemnor cannot acquire the property in fee simple if it can obtain access 
or use of the property through other privileges or easements. The evidence not only reveals that 
there is no intended public use but also a willingness on the part of Cooksey, the 
owner/condemnee, to give the airport an easement and restrict the area in question from any 
building.91 
 
A subsequent decision affirmed this reasoning: “Rather, it was decided that if the target property could be utilized 
through non-possessory means such as a privilege or easement—the ownership interest sought must reflect that 
limited utility.”92 Cooksey was also seen as a failure to negotiate in good faith.93 Cooksey was the first of several 
recent decisions indicating courts’ willingness to weigh in on public use or purpose arguments.  
 
In Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't v. Moore, 559 S.W.3d 374 (Ky. 2018) the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed 
the Cooksey decision — this time in favor of the condemnor. The condemnor sought a permanent easement while 
the property owner argued there should have been a fee simple taking. The condemnor argued it should not be 
saddled with ownership of small tracts of land which require ongoing maintenance when a permanent easement 
serves the public purpose. The court agreed: 
 
We, accordingly, reaffirm the Cooksey rule because it accurately reflects the public policy implicit 
in KRS 416.550. We reiterate that when a governmental unit needs to take a small area out of a 
larger estate, it should take the least possible interest, such as an easement, so that if the public 
                                                                
89 Id. 
90 Pike Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Ford, 279 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Ky. 1955). 
91 City of Bowling Green v. Cooksey, 858 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Ky. App. 1992). 
92 City of Audubon Park v. Louisville Reg'l Airport Auth., No. 2016-CA-000059-DG, (Ky. App. 2017) Unpub. LEXIS 772, 
at *6.  
93 Cooksey at 192. 
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purpose for the tract is concluded, it may be reintegrated into the original estate unburdened by 
the prior public taking.94  
 
The ruling in Sprint Communications Company, L.P. v. Albert E. Leggett, III (As Trustee of the Albert E. Leggett Family 
Trust, 307 S.W.3d 109, (Ky. 2010) serves as a warning to condemnors that egregious conduct such as posturing as a 
condemnation action can become a civil rights action under 42 USC § 1983 and an abuse of process action. Before 
condemnation, Sprint attempted to purchase the Leggett property, but the property owner refused the offer. During 
negotiations the agent repeatedly warned that without an agreement, a condemnation action would be filed, 
requiring time and legal costs. When no agreement was reached Sprint filed an action seeking to take a permanent 
utility easement over a .5-acre tract of land which included a photography studio. The company planned to raze the 
building and build a facility to house computers, generators, and other equipment. Leggett raised a right-to-take 
challenge and countersued, arguing that Spring had abused the process and was attempting to take property in 
violation of the federal and state constitutions. Sprint only had statutory authority to condemn for utility lines — not 
a company facility. Sprint moved to dismiss the condemnation action thinking that would eliminate the 
counterclaims as well. It did not. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision allowing the 
counterclaims to proceed against Sprint although the condemnation action had been dismissed.  
 
4.2.1.3 Public Benefit versus Public Use 
In Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1979), the Kentucky Supreme Court examined the difference 
between public benefit and public use. The case involved the City of Owensboro attempting to condemn land for 
economic development in accordance with the Kentucky Local Industrial Development Act. The court identified its 
ability to distinguish between public use and public benefit in the Constitution:  
 
The Kentucky Constitution, particularly Sections 13 and 242, has been interpreted repeatedly to 
prohibit the taking of private property for public use without compensation, and this prohibition 
has been consistently construed to forbid the taking of private property for private uses. 29A C.J.S. 
Eminent Domain § 29, at 251 (1965). Both of these sections of our Constitution carefully use the 
term "public use" as contrasted with Section 171 of the same Constitution that commands taxes 
be levied and collected for "public purposes" only.95 
 
The decision turned on whether the Kentucky Local Industrial Development Act constitutes public use of private 
lands condemned under its authority. The City argued the court should regard public benefit as an equivalent to 
public use and urged the Court to adopt an expansive definition of public purpose, one which would include the 
issuance of revenue bonds by a city or county to acquire industrial property. It would also include instances where 
public funds spent to promote industrial development by attracting new industry to all parts of the state.96 
 
Affirming a ruling by the Court of Appeals, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Kentucky Local Industrial 
Authority Act is unconstitutional insofar as it grants a city or other governmental unit the unconditional right to 
condemn private property which is to be conveyed for private development for industrial or commercial purposes. 
Citing the Court of Appeals the Supreme Court found, "No 'public use' is involved where the land of A is condemned 
merely to enable B to build a factory or C to construct a shopping center."97 This reasoning guarantees Kentucky 
                                                                
94 See also Kroger Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Air Bd., 308 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Ky. 1957) which held “The general 
rule is well stated in 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, Section 109, page 736, in this language: "The grantee of the power 
of eminent domain may ordinarily exercise a large discretion not only in respect of the particular property, but also 
as to the amount of land to be taken for the public purpose. This discretion is not reviewable by the courts, unless, 
possibly, where there has been a gross abuse or manifest fraud." Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't v. Moore, 559 
S.W.3d 374, 381 (Ky. 2018).  
95 Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1979). 
96 See Id. 
97 Owensboro, supra. 3, 7-8. 
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property owners will never be placed in the precarious position that property owners in the infamous United States 
Supreme Court case of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) found themselves in. The City 
of New London condemned a middle-class neighborhood to let a drug company build a facility there. The court ruled 
that the public benefit of an increased tax base was sufficient reason to let the condemnations proceed. Five years 
after the Kelo decision the drug company moved to a neighboring town. Ten years after the decision, a large portion 
of the condemned land remained vacant. 
 
A recent case again highlighted the differences between public use and public benefit. In Crain v. Hardin Cty. Water 
Dist. No. 2, No. 2015-CA-000499-MR, 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 416, (Ky. App. 2016) property owners conveyed 
an agricultural conservation easement to the PACE Corporation, an independent municipal corporation attached for 
administrative purposes to the Kentucky Department of Agriculture. The corporation holds titles to agricultural 
conservation easements purchased by the Commonwealth to restrict or prevent the development or improvement 
of land for purposes other than agricultural production. PACE corporation also receives funds from a USDA program. 
As such, the USDA had a contingent right to enforce the easement. When the water district sought to condemn land 
owned by the Crains which had an overlaying PACE easement, the Crains raised a right-to-take challenge arguing 
that the agricultural conservation easement precludes any taking for a non-agricultural purpose. The Court of 
Appeals unanimously held that a public benefit is different than a public use and a public benefit does not preclude 
condemnation: 
 
Under the terms of the agricultural conservation easement, neither the Commonwealth nor the 
public is granted a right to come onto the Crains' property. Rather, the Commonwealth simply 
obtained the right to restrict certain future development of the property. While this is clearly a 
public purpose, we agree with the trial court that it does not constitute a prior public use of the 
property. Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing the District's condemnation petition to 
proceed.98 
 
4.2.1.4 What Does and Does Not Constitute Bad Faith? 
Right-to-take challenges based on bad faith allegations typically focus on pre-condemnation negotiations. A ruling 
from the late-1800s affirmed the requirement to negotiate in good faith before condemning property. The Portland 
& G. Tpk. Co. v. Bobb, 88 Ky. 226, 229-31, 10 S.W. 794, 795-96 (Ky. 1889) decision noted, “If the land be not necessary 
for its use it cannot, under the statute, condemn it; nor can it do so unless it has first, in good faith, made an effort 
to obtain it by contract. They are conditions precedent to the exercise of the right of condemnation.” 99 These things 
are required because: 
 
The sovereign power vests it for certain purposes, and with a view to a public service, with the 
power of eminent domain; but it does so upon certain conditions, and with these it should strictly 
comply in view of the extraordinary power given to it over the property of the citizen.100 
 
Pike County Board of Education v. Ford, 279 S. W. 2d 245, (Ky. 1955) centered on a right-to-take challenge based on 
allegations of bad faith. In that case a school board sought to condemn property for a new school. The owner moved 
to set aside the verdict and dismiss the condemnation petition because the low value used to make an offer on the 
property constituted bad faith. The Court of Appeals held: 
 
The appellees argue also that the Board did not make a bona fide effort to purchase the property. 
We have indicated that a “take it or leave it” offer is not a good faith offer. Paducah Ice Mfg. Co. 
v. City of Paducah, 289 Ky. 31, 157 S. W. 2d 490, 491. It is true that the Board’s offer of $5,000 was 
                                                                
98 Crain v. Hardin Cty. Water Dist. No. 2, No. 2015-CA-000499-MR, 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 416, at 14 (Ct. App. 
June 17, 2016). 
99 Portland & G. Tpk. Co. v. Bobb, 88 Ky. 226, 229-31, 10 S.W. 794, 795-96 (Ky. 1889). See also Howard Realty Co. v. 
Paducah & I. R. Co., 182 Ky. 494, 498, 206 S.W. 774, 776 (Ky. 1918). 
100 Id. 
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decidedly inadequate, but the matter was left open for further negotiation. The letter wherein the 
offer was made contained this statement: “If Mrs. Ford and her son feel that they can make some 
offer with some degree of reasonableness attached thereto, we shall be happy to receive and 
consider their offer.” That was not a “take it or leave it” offer, but a request for a reasonable offer 
in return. We are unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that there was no good faith effort to 
negotiate.101  
 
This case is important because of the instruction it provides to right-of-way negotiators. On occasion, right-of-way 
contact notes written by negotiators will indicate the property owner requested a counteroffer and was told the 
agency does not make counteroffers. This can result in a right-to-take challenge based on an allegation that the 
owner was given a take it or leave it offer. This type of challenge can and should be avoided by heeding the advice 
indicated above and reaffirmed with a follow-up letter. Agents should be directed to make the letter language 
situation specific.  
 
Seven years after the Ford decision the Kentucky Supreme Court made it clear that state agencies should be given 
deference when a property owner challenges the right to condemn property. In Com., D.O.H. v. Fultz, 360 S.W. 2d 
216 (Ky. 1962) thirteen cases were consolidated after one went to trial, resulting in a jury verdict the Department of 
Highways thought was excessive. The Department also thought the Commissioners’ Awards in pending suits were 
too high and eventually issued an Official Order abandoning the project. All pending suits on the project were 
dismissed (without prejudice to allow the suits to be refiled) and attempts to acquire any additional property were 
frozen. The Department began renegotiating and issued an order reinstating the first official order while cancelling 
the one abandoning the project. The next year the Department filed new suits to acquire property on the project. 
Property owners argued the old suits barred the new ones and that the Department had not acted in good faith in 
abandoning the old suits. They also argued the Department was bound by the jury verdict in the one case that had 
gone to trial. The trial judge dismissed the new suits by ruling that there was never an unconditional good faith 
abandonment of the project or of the old suits. The Supreme Court saw it differently noting that, “Good faith is, of 
course, strictly a matter of intention as of the time the action in question was taken.” The ruling explained: 
 
We think that the official actions of a state officer at cabinet level, especially when coupled with 
his word under oath, must be given a strong presumption of good faith, rebuttable only by evidence 
of the most convincing weight and character. Naturally the rebutting evidence in such a case will 
be circumstantial, as it was in this case, but if the circumstances shown are equally consistent with 
either good faith or bad faith at the time of the official action, our opinion is that they are not 
enough to sustain a case of bad faith [original emphasis].102  
 
Since then, other cases have alleged bad faith as a basis for a right-to-take challenge. For the most part, they have 
not been successful. For example, in Usher and Gardner, Inc. v. Mayfield Ind. Bd. of Ed., 461 S. W. 2d 560, (Ky. 1971) 
the decision held that refusing an absurd counteroffer is not bad faith by noting that “A single take-it-or-leave-it 
offer of a manifestly inadequate amount could well evidence a failure to make a reasonable effort to acquire the 
land by contract of private sale.”103 This is consistent with a subsequent decision in Coke v. Com., Commissioner of 
Parks, 502 S.W. 2d 57 (Ky. 1974) where the Supreme Court ruled a condemnor is not required to haggle with an 
owner during a negotiation.104 An offer made without benefit of a of a survey or appraisal is not sufficient proof of 
bad faith.105 According to the courts, lack of experience on the part of the negotiator or making an offer without an 
                                                                
101 Pike County Board of Education v. Ford, 279 S. W. 2d 245, 249 (Ky. 1955). 
102 Pike County Board of Education v. Ford, 279 S. W. 2d 245, 249 (Ky. 1955); Com., D.O.H. v. Fultz, 360 S.W. 2d 216, 
222 (Ky. 1962). 
103 Usher & Gardner, Inc. v. Mayfield Indep. Bd. of Educ., 461 S.W.2d 560, 562-63 (Ky. 1970). 
104 See also Eaton Asphalt Paving Co. v. CSX Transp., 8 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. App. 1999). 
105 Vincent v. City of Powderly, unpublished, WL 22025850, (Ky. App. 2003). 
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appraisal does not rise to the level of bad faith.106 A condemnor refusing to accept a property owner’s legal argument 
during negotiations is not bad faith.107  
 
Note, the remedy for denying a right-to-take based on a finding of bad faith negotiations is dismissal of the case. The 
condemnor is free to begin negotiations anew and refile if negotiations are unsuccessful.108 
 
Another line of right-to-take challenges based on a bad faith argument involved an allegation that the condemnor 
lacked everything needed to allow a project to move forward. In N. Ky. Port Auth., Inc. v. Cornett, 625 S.W.2d 104 
(Ky. 1981) the project required an approved permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to operate a riverport. 
The condemnor applied for the permit, but it was not approved. The property owner alleged bad faith since there 
was no certainty that the project would proceed. This was a case of first impression for Kentucky’s courts. Although 
there was no proof submitted that the permit would not be awarded and the condemnor asserted it believed 
permission would be forthcoming, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled against the condemnor. The 
Kentucky Supreme Court did not agree, citing holdings from two different states: 
 
Action must be tempered with wisdom. Is it wise, proper, or necessary that this court construe the 
statutes applicable to the present condemnation proceeding so narrowly that we defeat the very 
purpose for which the statutes were adopted? It is not conceivable that all phases of the 
development of the riverport be completed simultaneously or completed within a reasonable 
time, one from the other, before condemnation proceedings may be instituted. In Sellors v. Town 
of Concord, 329 Mass. 259, 107 N.E.2d 784 (1952), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
said: 
 
". . . That a possibility exists that the land may not be devoted to the proposed uses 
cannot be denied. But in the absence of evidence that the town cannot reasonably 
expect to achieve its public purposes, we cannot deny its right-to-take land by eminent 
domain. Obviously in the carrying out of the projects contemplated by the town many 
steps must be taken, and they cannot all be taken at once. The town would hardly be in 
a position to ask the board of appeals for permission to use the land for municipal 
purposes before it had acquired the land . . . ." 107 at 786. 
 
In Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis.2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977), the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin considered a challenge to eminent domain proceedings on the basis that it is 
conceivable that the land may not be used. In disposing of this issue, the court wrote: 
 
". . . There will always be some possibility that a planned improvement will not be 
completed and put to the use intended. The test cannot be whether it is possible, 
whether it is conceivable that the project would fail. The test must be whether there is 
a reasonable assurance that the intended use will come to pass. If there is reasonable 
probability that the public utility will comply with all applicable standards, will meet all 
requirements for the issuance of necessary permits, and will not otherwise fail or be 
unable to prosecute its undertaking to completion, there is a right of condemnation." 
248 N.W.2d at 893. 
 
The condemnor has acted in good faith, with a reasonable assurance that the project will come to 
pass. N. Ky. Port Auth., Inc. v. Cornett, 625 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Ky. 1981).109 
 
                                                                
106 Crain v. Hardin Cty. Water Dist. No. 2, No. 2015-CA-000499-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 416, (Ky. App. 2016); See also Milam 
v. Viking Energy Holdings, LLC, 370 S.W.3d 530 (Ky. App. 2012). 
107 Eaton Asphalt Paving Co. v. CSX Transp., 8 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. App. 1999). 
108 Golden Foods, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County, 240 S.W.3d 679, (Ky. App. 2007). 
109 N. Ky. Port Auth., Inc. v. Cornett, 625 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Ky. 1981). 
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Proof of gross abuse or manifest fraud is required to deny the right-to-take.110 In applying that the reasonable 
assurance standard of review, facts of gross abuse were found in the case of BIF, Inc. v. Cty. Of Campbell, No. 2007-
CA-000047-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 858, (Ky. App. 2007): 
 
The court concluded that following the loss of federal funding, TANK had not taken any steps to 
develop alternative plans for the transit center, nor had it developed a financial plan or 
appropriated funding for the project. Further, the court noted that the substantial changes to the 
project without approval from TANK's Board or the Campbell County Fiscal Court was evidence of 
"gross abuse," and was sufficient grounds for denying TANK's condemnation petition.111  
 
However, courts have not been willing to rule that initiating a condemnation action before obtaining funding is bad 
faith on its face.  
 
While the court did not address the materiality of the issues concerning the timing of Board 
approval for funding of the project, and the project's absence in WKU's "Master Plan," 
nonetheless, the Clarks fail to provide any authority, as required by CR 76.12, to support its 
contention that this action, or inaction, on behalf of WKU evinces bad faith so as to disturb the 
deference we afford to the court's findings on appeal. As a result, we decline to address the merits 
of this claim.112 
 
An experienced practitioner of condemnation cases often knows with a degree of certainty what appellate courts 
will consider as good or bad faith actions. In clear instances of good faith, it may be acceptable to consider a strategy 
that would allow for entry onto the property during the appeal. This strategy is considered in Section 5.7. 
                                                                
110 Com., D.O.H. v. Cooksey, 948 S.W. 2d 122, 123 (Ky. App. 1997). 
111 BIF, Inc. v. Cty. Of Campbell, No. 2007-CA-000047-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 858, at *5 (Ky. App. 2007). 
112 Clark v. Bd. Of Regents of W. Ky. Univ., 311 S.W.3d 726, 730 (Ky. App. 2010). 
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Chapter 5 Beneficial Strategies 
 
This chapter reviews eight potential strategies available to condemnation practitioners which may accelerate the 
handling of right-to-take challenges or reduce the amount of time needed to obtain right of entry. None require 
statutory changes.  
 
5.1 Right of Entry Agreements 
Right of entry agreements are authorized by 49 CFR §24.102(j) which reads: 
 
(j) Payment before taking possession. Before requiring the owner to surrender possession of the 
real property, the Agency shall pay the agreed purchase price to the owner, or in the case of a 
condemnation, deposit with the court, for the benefit of the owner, an amount not less than the 
Agency's approved appraisal of the fair market value of such property, or the court award of 
compensation in the condemnation proceeding for the property. In exceptional circumstances, 
with the prior approval of the owner, the Agency may obtain a right-of-entry for construction 
purposes before making payment available to an owner. (see appendix A, § 24.102(j).) 
 
The regulation requires exceptional circumstances, as well as owner approval, and sanctions entry before making 
payment to the owner and solely for the purpose of construction. This logically enables an agreed right of entry prior 
to obtaining an IOJ and filing suit. We found no cases that elucidate the phrase exceptional circumstances, likely 
because this tool involves the property owner’s consent, which by its nature would avoid controversy. 
 
Agreement details can vary, but they should contain some common elements. First, the agreement can allow a 
condemnor to enter the property to begin construction before a condemnation action is filed. Some but not all 
agreements will not require paying compensation until a later date. Usually, the agreement commits the condemnor 
to filing a condemnation case within a specific timeframe (30–60 days). Typically, the agreement allows for posting 
of the original state offer in lieu of the Commissioners’ Award. The agreement always requires the property owner’s 
consent as they are a signatory. The agreement is typically re-affirmed via an Agreed IOJ which reserved each party’s 
right to challenge the amount of compensation. These agreements vest great power in the condemnor and should 
be used only on rare occasions and with clear commitment by both parties. 
 
Benefit 
• These agreements can avoid the need for court commissioners and allow for prelitigation entry. 
 
5.2 Agreed Interlocutory Orders  
Opportunities are available during pre-condemnation negotiations to use a request for a small plan change for a 
promise to enter an Agreed IOJ. This is best done by a right of entry agreement, but if the circumstances do not lend 
themselves to using this agreement they can be done after the petition is filed if the property owner is still willing. 
An Agreed IOJ may be useful if the Commissioners’ Award is lower than the state’s offer. In these instances, it can 
be a substitute for the state’s offer the Commissioners’ Award. Unlike a right of entry agreement, this scenario does 




• This strategy can save time necessary for commissioners to be appointed and report. It saves time needed for a 
motion and a court appearance to obtain a right of entry.  
 
5.3 Motions to Strike 
If an answer contains more allegations than is statutorily allowed, the logical action is a motion to strike the answer. 
According to the Civil Rules of Procedure, a motion to strike a pleading must be made within 20 days of when the 
pleading is filed. This motion may strike the entire pleading or a portion of the offending pleading.  
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The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure state:  
 
Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by 
these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him or upon the 
court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or 
any sham, redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.113 
 
The courts have enforced this rule, holding: 
 
Civil Rule 12.06 provides that a motion to strike shall be filed within twenty days after the service 
of a pleading. Appellee did not file its motion to strike until more than twenty days after the 
appellants had filed their answer and exceptions. If appellee had filed its motion to strike in a 
timely fashion, and the motion had been sustained, then the appellants would have still had time 
within which to file their exceptions.114 
 
In the case quoted above, the then Department of Transportation attempted to strike the answer which contained 
exceptions. Although the decision appears to contradict KRS §416.600 and Ratliff since the answer did not contain a 
right-to-take challenge — the only relevant content in an answer to a condemnation petition — it is not inconsistent. 
The holding simply enforced the civil rule dictating that motions to strike be made within 20 days. The court may 
have sustained the motion to strike had it been made in a timely manner. As the court noted, the property owner 
would still have time to file exceptions even though the answer would have been stricken.  
 
Benefit 
• This strategy prevents the court from considering irrelevant issues before an IOJ is obtained. 
 
5.4 Motions to Expedite 
Many local rules provide for an economical litigation docket, which applies to property rights.115 Rules allow for a 
status conference to be set 15 days after the last responsive pleading (answer or counter claim) is filed. A pretrial 
conference must be set for 60 days after the status conference. The trial date is set for 30 days after the pretrial 
conference. Judges have the option to extend these timeframes.116 Use of a tightly scheduled rule is contingent on 
the attorney’s ability to move quickly (which is influenced by factors such as document collection and case load). 
 
Even if the rules lack such a docket, when faced with a right-to-take controversy the parties have a right to an 
expedited process to resolve the issue. A reminder to the Court of this requirement can be made via a Motion to 
Expedite. This holds for both trial court and appellate courts (see Section 1.2.2). 
 
Benefit 
• Motions to expedite remind the court of its responsibility to resolve right-to-take challenges quickly. They may 
also thwart attempts to delay the right-to-take hearing and decision. 
 
5.5 Motions to Dismiss or Filing a Second Condemnation Action after the Alleged Right-to-take Deficiency has 
been Corrected 
Golden Foods, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.3 679 (Ky. App. 2007) presents an 
interesting strategy. In that case, the condemnor lost a right-to-take challenge based on bad faith negotiations and 
the case was dismissed. While the condemnor appealed the dismissal, they began negotiations anew; when they 
were unsuccessful, they proceeded with a second condemnation case. The property owner challenged the right-to-
                                                                
113 Ky. CR Rule 12.06 
114 Stidham v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Highways, 579 S.W.2d 372, 373-74 (Ky. App. 1978). 
115 Ky. CR 89(1)(d). 
116 Ky. CR 90(1). 
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take in the second suit, but this time the court found good faith on the part of the condemnor. The case proceeded 
to determine compensation, and the original appeal was dismissed. 
 
The precedent set by this case is that if a right-to-take challenge has been raised but not resolved, one solution — 
if the alleged deficiency can be corrected — is to dismiss the first action, renegotiate, and if unsuccessful, refile the 
condemnation suit.  
 
A second path is to continue until a judgement is issued. If the judgment finds against the condemnor, negotiations 
can begin anew while an appeal continues. Alleged deficiencies can be addressed during these negotiations. If the 
parties still cannot reach an agreement, a second condemnation action can be filed while the appeal is pending. 
 
Benefit 
• Correcting the alleged deficiency and refiling a suit short circuits the appeal time of a successful right to 
take challenge. 
 
5.6 Motions for Summary Judgment 
A speedy hearing on the right-to-take issue is essential. However, the parties are not entitled to short-circuit the 
process by dispensing with a hearing on the right to condemn. Pursuant to City of Bowling Green v. Cooksey, 858 
S.W.2d 190, (Ky. App. 1992), a landowner is entitled to a hearing before the trial court on the petitioner's right to 
condemn.117 While this was a Court of Appeals case, the city of Bowling Green requested the Kentucky Supreme 
Court to review the decision. The Supreme Court declined this petition, which gives the decision more precedential 
weight. God’s Center v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 125 S.W. 3d 295 (Ky. App. 2002) adhered to 
this precedent. The ruling reversed an IOJ granting LFUCG the right-to-take and sent the case back to the trial court 
for a bench trial on the issue because: 
  
After reviewing the law governing eminent domain and summary judgment, this Court held that 
God’s Center was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on its factual allegations challenging the 
legality of the LFUCG’s actions.118  
 
However, a motion for summary judgment can only be used to expedite the process if the property owner making 
the challenge waives their right to a hearing. If resolving a right-to-take issue via summary judgment is desirable, it 
may be necessary to obtain agreed stipulations from the opposing side so no questions of fact can prevent such a 
motion. Otherwise, a motion for summary judgment is not appropriate and the only remedy is to press the court for 
an expedited hearing, which is required under the statute. 
 
Whether a right-to-take issue can be decided by a motion for summary judgment was at issue in Matthews v. City of 
Bellevue, No. 2003-CA-002237-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 360, (Ky. App. 2005). The court had no issue with handling the 
challenge via summary judgment because the parties agreed to do so. But the trial court was cautioned that any 
decision — whether resulting from a hearing or summary judgment motion — must be based written findings of 
facts and conclusions of law.  
 
From the record and docket sheet in this matter, we cannot discern whether an actual hearing was 
held on the City's right to condemn. There are no videotapes or transcriptions of a hearing in the 
record before us. It appears that the trial court ordered the parties to file simultaneous briefs on 
the issue of the right-to-take, and the trial court simply ruled based on the briefs. Neither party 
takes issue with the trial court's handling the matter in this method, nor do we absent a preserved 
objection by one of the parties. 
 
Matthews styled her brief as a motion for summary judgment, while the City filed a "Verified 
Petition for Condemnation." Regardless of the title given to the respective briefs, it is clear from 
                                                                
117 See City of Bowling Green v. Cooksey, 858 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Ky. App. 1992). 
118 God’s Center v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 125 S.W. 3d 295, 298 (Ky. App. 2002). 
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the parties' briefs before the trial court that they were requesting that the trial court make a 
finding on the City's right-to-take Matthews's property. However, in ruling on the parties' briefs, 
the trial court failed to make any findings whatsoever in regard to whether substantial evidence 
existed to support the City's decision to condemn. 
 
Matthews pointed out this omission to the circuit court in a Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate. 
Accordingly, she met the requirements of CR 52.04. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court 
overruled it and summarily stated that: 
 
Respondent’s Motion to alter, amend or vacate argues that the weight of the evidence and 
legal precedent does not support the legal conclusions made by the Court. However, 
Respondent re-argues the same points that this Court thoroughly disposed of prior to 
entering the [earlier] order. 
 
Hence, the trial court failed a second time to make the required findings pursuant to CR 
52.01 and KRS 416.610 regarding the evidence supporting the City's right-to-take Matthews's 
property. Accordingly, we hereby remand this matter to the Campbell Circuit Court for findings 
consistent with this opinion, and we affirm in part, for the reasons so stated, on the other issues 
before this Court.119 
 
The ruling in Matthews provides the following warning to all practitioners in condemnation cases asked to propose 
an order resulting from a summary judgment motion — make certain the order contains the appropriate findings of 
facts and conclusions of law.  
 
Benefit 
• Summary judgment motions obviate the need for a hearing.  
 
5.7 Supersedeas Bonds and Stays  
At the end of a bench trial to determine if a condemnor has the right under eminent domain to acquire property, a 
judge enters one of two orders: “Upon deciding that such right does exist in the condemnor, an interlocutory 
judgment is entered [and the case moves forward to determine compensation]. Should the trial court rule that the 
condemnor does not have the right to condemn, the trial judge is directed to enter a final judgment [dismissing the 
action]. KRS §416.610(4).”120 If the right to condemn exists and the Commissioners’ Award is tendered, the right of 
entry is perfected. “It is inescapable that an immediate right of entry and possession was considered as of prime 
importance by the General Assembly when Chapter 186 of the Acts of 1948 was passed.”121  
  
However, the Ratliff decision acknowledged a constitutional right to appeal the trial court’s right-to-take decision. 
In reviewing when this appeal should happen two choices emerged: immediately after determining the issue of the 
right-to-take or at the end of the jury trial on the issue of compensation. 
 
The court concluded the status quo demands protection because, if the condemnor were allowed to proceed with 
the planned construction and/or destruction, the condemnee could never return to their same position.122 The 
Ratliff holding acknowledged the condemnor might suffer if the parties wait until after completing the trial on 
compensation, noting the “condemnor could easily suffer by a condemnee's action in "laying under the log" and 
allowing excessive damages to accrue, prior to appeal.123 The Ratliff judgement held that an appeal immediately 
                                                                
119 Matthews v. City of Bellevue, No. 2003-CA-002237-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 360, at *10-12 (Ky. App. 2005) 
120 Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell Cty., 617 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1981). 
121 Linn v. Bryan, 312 Ky. 203, 205, 226 S.W.2d 959, 960 (1950). While this was a constitutional challenge to a now-
repealed eminent domain statute, the current statute has similar language. 
122 The court noted, “A possible remedy to prevent the immediate taking is set forth in Stillpass v. Kenton County 
Airport Board, Inc., Ky., 403 S.W.2d 46 (1966)”, which will be discussed below. 
123 Id. 
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after entering the right-to-condemn decision preserves the status quo and is demanded by Ky. Const., Sec. 115.124 
Some legal scholars have interpreted dicta in Ratliff 125 as requiring an automatic stay, which prevents a right of 
entry until the appeal is concluded, but it does not. Ratliff does not explicitly state the appealing party does not need 
to ask for such an injunction or stay. 
 
Ratliff intended that such an appeal be consistent with Stillpass v. Niblack, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1964)126 as it 
was refenced the case in the decision. The plaintiffs in Stillpass brought a separate suit against the judge hearing 
their condemnation case. They asked that the judge be prevented from entering an order allowing the condemnor 
to take possession of their property. A decision granting the condemnor the right-to-take had been entered. The 
Court of Appeals acknowledged a property owner appealing a right-to-take decision is entitled to a temporary 
injunction during the appeal of that decision if the facts show the landowner will be subject to irreparable damage. 
The injunction can be sought from the trial court within the same condemnation action, but it requires a request for 
such an injunction. 
 
If it is ruled the condemnor has a right-to-take, KRS § 416.610(2) requires that a judge authorize the condemnor to 
take possession for the purposes set forth in the petition. To hold there is an implied and automatic stay to such 
authorization contradicts this statutory requirement. This is especially true when KRS § 416.610(2) is coupled with 
KRS § 416.620 (2) which states: “Appeals may be taken to the Court of Appeals from the final judgment of the Circuit 
Court as in other cases except that an appeal by the owner shall not operate as a supersedeas.”127  
 
Initially, since there is no specific mention of an appeal from the interlocutory order determining the right to 
condemn, one could argue that KRS § 416.620 (2) refers to the final decision on compensation since this section of 
the statute directly refers to a trial of the exceptions to the interlocutory order. That is what the trial court in Ratliff 
held: “The only question appealable is the question of damages.” However, the Supreme Court, in overturning that 
determination, observed:  
 
In accordance with the theory of statutory construction, we believe that the general assembly was 
cognizant of the constitutional article when it enacted the new eminent domain act. Cook v. Ward, 
Ky., 381 S.W.2d 168 (1964). We are, when considering the constitutionality of a statute, obliged to 
give it, if possible, the interpretation which upholds its constitutional validity. George v. Scent, Ky., 
346 S.W.2d 784 (1961).128  
 
To maintain consistency with Ratliff, the statute must be read with the assumption that the legislature was informed 
and acting consistent with the newly adopted constitutional amendment giving a right to appeal a right-to-take 
decision. Accordingly, it must also be interpreted that the final judgement of the circuit court referenced in KRS § 
416.620 (2) spoke of the appeal of the final order determining a right-to-take issue. When interpreted consistently, 
                                                                
124 See Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell Cty., 617 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Ky. 1981). 
125 An injunction “… certainly is not, however, as protective to the right of a condemnee as an immediate appeal, 
which preserves the status quo, and which, we believe, is demanded by Ky. Const., Sec. 115, the provisions of which 
were known by the 1976 General Assembly.”  
126 Proffitt v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 850 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1993) appears to be an inconsistent 
decision. The Supreme Court determined a property owner alleging arbitrariness and abuse of discretion in a right-
to-take challenge was properly denied a stay of the IOJ even though she was willing to post a supersedeas bond. She 
argued Ratliff gave the property owner in a condemnation action the right stay possession of the property by taking 
an immediate appeal. The denial by the Profitt court could be because the property owner conceded her land was 
necessary for the project and for a public use. Profitt distinguished Ratliff which was concerned the public use of 
condemned property rather than arbitrary power and/or abuse of discretion. 
127 Supersedeas, in this context, is defined as an order suspending the power of a trial court to allow a winning party 
to act upon the decision granting the right to enter upon the property for construction purposes while the decision 
is being appealed. It is obtained by making a motion to stay the judgment. If the order is stayed, the party can request 
a supersedeas bond. 
128 Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell Cty., 617 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1981). 
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an appeal from that final order on a right-to-take issue does not act as a supersedeas. If a party wants a stay, it must 
request one, as the Supreme Court noted in Ratliff: “In the instant case, the condemnee made no effort to use the 
procedure set out in Stillpass, and apparently made no effort to have the final judgment of the trial court address 
the right of the condemnor to take her property.129  
 
The Court describes the balancing of interests when the question of granting a stay is at the forefront. The goal is to 
preserve the status quo for both parties.  
We believe that if the right of immediate possession (and all that such implies) is exercised, in 
many instances, even if an appellate court later reverses the trial court's determination of the 
condemnor's right-to-take, that the condemnee cannot be returned to his same position. …. The 
balancing of the equities of condemnor and the private citizen whose property can be taken is not 
an easy one.130 
The ability to return the property owner to his or her same position must be balanced against costs incurred by the 
public due to delays. In balancing these interests, proof of the detriment to both parties should be considered. Ratliff 
did not consider that an increase in construction prices would not allow the condemnor to maintain status quo 
during an appeal. Taxpayers pay those extra costs. Seasonal restrictions on construction imposed by environmental 
requirements can prolong delays. Delays due to environmental restrictions can also result in mitigation fees. 
Environmental permits obtained when the project was on schedule may, if the project sits idle, require extensions 
or even renewal. These impose additional costs. If the project calls for replacing deficient structures, delays will 
require additional repair to keep the roadway open and safe. If the project calls for reconstructing unsafe roadway 
conditions, safety issues to the traveling public remain although they cannot be mitigated. Maintenance costs 
increase. The possibility of slides becoming unstable requires temporary yet costly repairs instead of being 
permanently corrected. Pavement condition may deteriorate and require intermediate repair with measurable 
costs. Project dates are often sensitive to community events and school schedules, again turning a small delay into 
a longer one. All of these factors warrant consideration. Should a court determine the property owner would be at 
a significant and irreparable disadvantage if a stay pending the appeal of a right-to-take decision is not granted, the 
impacts to a condemnor should be mitigated. In fact, later cases have determined that to effectuate a stay of a right-
to-take order, a supersedeas bond is required.131 
 
It is unlikely a court will allow for entry and construction on a regular basis. But the particulars of an individual case 
may give a court reason to consider entry for construction, or at least require mitigation of impacts caused by delay. 
Mitigation can be accomplished by requiring a supersedeas bond. A supersedeas bond is “a bond required of one 
who petitions to set aside a judgment or execution and from which the other party may be made whole if the action 
is unsuccessful.”132 Supersedeas bonds are authorized by CR 62.03 which allows for a stay, and CR 73.04, which 
provides for a supersedeas bond. CR 73.04 reads in part: 
 
When the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount of the bond 
shall be fixed at such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, 
costs on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay…133 
 
In January 2020 the Court of Appeals ruled that supersedeas bonds are not required to appeal a right-to-take 
decision in a condemnation case. However, they are required to stay an order granting the right-to-take: 
  
                                                                
129 Ratliff at 39. 
130 Id. 
131 Allard v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 602 S.W.3d 800 (Ky. App. 2020). 
132 Henry Campbell Black, M.A., Nolan, J.R., Connolly, M.J., Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, West Publishing Co., 
1979, p. 1289. 
133 Ky. CR Rule 73.04 
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The property owners are not required to post a supersedeas bond to file their appeal. However, they are 
required to post a supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the judgment against them while they appeal. 
Pursuant to CR 62.03 and CR 73.04, an appellant must post an adequate supersedeas bond to stay enforcement 
of a judgment pending appeal. This guarantees the appellee's recovery of "costs, interest and damages for 
delay[.]" CR 73.04(1). The trial court did not err by requiring the property owners to post supersedeas bonds to 
stay enforcement of the judgment.134 
 
In May 2020, the Court of Appeals again held that a supersedeas bond or an injunction is required before an 
Interlocutory order is stayed in an eminent domain case.  
 
We note that Allard did not seek an injunction as suggested in Ratliff or post a supersedeas bond 
to stay enforcement of the interlocutory judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 
(CR) 62.03 and CR 73.04. And we agree with Big Rivers that Ratliff did not abrogate KRS 
416.610(2)(c) or any part of the Eminent Domain Act. Therefore, we find no merit in Allard's 
argument that, once he appealed the interlocutory judgment, Big Rivers did not have the right-to-
take possession of the easement upon the payment of the award.135 
 
Both decisions are final and consistent with Ratliff. Their reasoning indicates a stay of the IOJ (preventing the 
condemnor from acting on it) is not automatic. A stay of the IOJ must be requested. If a stay is granted, the 
condemnor should be entitled to present proof that a supersedeas bond is appropriate.  
 
Benefit 
• These cases suggest there is room to explore asserting right of entry during appeal without trampling 
concerns over fairness. However, if attempted, it should be done fairly, strategically, and after thorough 
deliberation. 
 
5.8 Attorney Fees 
While attorney’s fees are not authorized by the Kentucky Eminent Domain Act, if a court finds a condemnor acted 
in bad faith or with unreasonable delay, in addition to losing a right-to-take challenge, the condemnor can also be 
forced to pay costs and attorney fees. As held in Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Highways v. Knieriem, 
707 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986): 
 
As a general rule, attorney's fees are not allowed in the absence of a statute or contract expressly 
providing therefor. Holsclaw v. Stephens, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 462, 480 (1974). We are referred to no 
statute or contract expressly providing for an award of attorney's fees in a proceeding involving 
eminent domain. In fact, KRS 453.260(5)(c) expressly exempts proceedings involving eminent 
domain from the statute authorizing the award of attorney's fees in certain actions. 
 
There was no bad faith or unreasonable delay by the condemnor shown here. Absent such a 
showing, we are reluctant to place the litigants in the position of allowing a landowner to gamble 
on litigation in the hope of being awarded attorney's fees rather than to accept legitimate offers 
of settlement. Allowing attorney's fees in a case such as this, where the condemnor has made an 
effort to take private property for what, in good faith, it thought at the time of the attempt was to 
be for a public use, would increase the cost to the public of acquiring property. It would also place 
an additional burden on the judicial process. We hold that the phrase "all costs" in KRS 
416.610(4)(c) does not include an award of attorney's fees.136 
                                                                
134 Barone v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2016-CA-001711-MR, 2016-CA-001712-MR, 2016-CA-001713-MR, 2016-CA-
001714-MR, 2016-CA-001715-MR, 2016-CA-001716-MR, 2016-CA-001717-MR, 2016-CA-001718-MR, 2016-CA-
001733-MR, 2016-CA-001734-MR, Unpub. (Ky. App. 2020). 
135 Allard, supra. This case also held a person objecting to the right-to-take does not have a right to an evidentiary 
hearing, which contradicts previous case law. 
136 Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Highways v. Knieriem, 707 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986). 
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The trial and appellate courts and Supreme Court agreed the property was being taken for a private, not public use 
and ruled in favor of the property owner. However, this finding did not require or trigger an award of attorney’s 
fees. 
 
Indeed, an award of attorney’s fees against a condemnor who loses a right-to-take challenge is not automatic, as 
articulated in Golden Foods, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.3d 679 (Ky. App. 2007): 
 
After applying the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion 
in denying Golden Foods' motion for attorney fees. We disagree with Golden Foods that a finding 
of bad faith requires a court to award attorney fees as a matter of law. In condemnation 
proceedings, trial courts are granted broad discretion in awarding attorney fees based on their 
analysis of the unique facts of each case and that discretion will not be disturbed unless equity 
demands that we do so. Bernard v. Russell County Air Board, 747 S.W.2d at 612. 
 
Although the trial court found that MSD had exercised legitimate authority in attempting to take 
land for public use, it recognized that MSD had failed to bargain in good faith during pre-
condemnation negotiations.137 
 
The Golden Foods decision mentioned two cases that exhibited extremely deliberate bad faith conduct that 
warranted imposing attorney’s fees on condemnors. One, N. Ky. Port Auth., Inc. v. Cornett, 700 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 
1985), awarded fees after a Port Authority initially filed suit to construct a riverport.  
 
The trial court dismissed the suit because the Port Authority had not obtained the necessary construction permit 
from the US Army Corps of Engineers. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, but the Kentucky Supreme Court 
reversed the Court of Appeals. After the Supreme Court decision, the trial court authorized the taking and discovery 
ensued. The Port Authority objected to the appraisal, so it moved to dismiss the suit without prejudice to its filing a 
new action in the future. The property owners moved for an award of attorney fees. The Court reasoned as follows: 
 
Considering the right of eminent domain, Kentucky case law, the Eminent Domain Act, and the 
apparent recognition in Kentucky of the court's discretion to award expenses under CR 41, we 
conclude that costs and attorney fees may be awarded in a voluntary dismissal of an attempted 
condemnation upon a finding of bad faith or unreasonable delay by the condemnor. If a trial court 
should determine that the condemnor has acted in bad faith, it should also determine the extent 
to which the condemnee has been prejudiced by a dismissal and whether he could be made 
reasonably whole by the imposition of costs and fees as a term or condition to the granting of the 
dismissal.138 
 
The Supreme Court noted that its earlier decision regarding good faith pertained only to the effort to obtain the US 
Army Corps of Engineers permit. The court noted the property owner had not yet been given the opportunity to 
submit evidence, so the trial court could not determine if the Port Authority had given the property owners the run-
around, forcing them to incur enormous defense expenses while attempting to wear them out and compel a 
settlement. That would show bad faith. 
 
Likewise, in Bernard v. Russell Cty. Air Bd., 747 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. App. 1987) the Court of Appeals found egregious 
conduct on the part of the condemnor. In this case, the Air Board obtained an order from an appointed special judge 
directing the property owners to permit a survey of their property. But there was a problem — no lawsuit had ever 
been filed from which the order could have arose. The property owners obtained a writ of prohibition against the 
judges, prohibiting the entry of any order not associated with a lawsuit. The Air Board then filed a condemnation 
action and got an order to proceed with the survey. The Court of Appeals again prevented the survey. The property 
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owners then moved to dismiss the condemnation action, arguing a failure to comply with the pre-filing requirements 
of KRS Chapter 416. The trial court ruled against the condemnee, but the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court 
ruled against the Air Board. Both courts held that it was not a legally formed body and had no authority to deprive 
any citizen of their property. The property owner moved for an award of attorney’s fees which, in keeping with past 
rulings, the trial court denied. The property owner appealed. The Court of Appeals did not mince words in its ruling: 
 
Condemnation proceedings that are blatantly illegitimate, and when instigated raise the specter 
of undue harassment and expense for a private citizen, inherently create a presumption of bad 
faith. It is conceivable that this presumption of bad faith could be rebutted in a case of milder 
circumstances; but it cannot in one whose facts are so harsh as these.  
 
We do not cavalierly disturb the discretion of any trial court, but considering these facts, and the 
law of the case, all of which were also known to the trial court, equity demands that we now do 
so.139 
 
While imposing attorney fees on a condemnor after a right-to-take hearing can be defended, imposition of attorney’s 
fees on a condemnee may also be pursued. Just as in cases involving the imposition of fees on a condemnor are not 
triggered automatically and require some form of egregious behavior, the actions of a losing property owner in a 
right-to-take challenge must also be egregious to have such a sanction imposed. In McGehee v. Commonwealth, No. 
2012-CA-000384-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 217 (Ky. App. 2017) the Court of Appeals upheld a decision by the trial court to 
impose attorney’s fees as a sanction against the property owners for egregious conduct involving a right-to-take 
challenge. The property owners appealed a right-to-take challenge. While the appeal was pending, they filed an 
action in Franklin Circuit Court attempting to halt the condemnation. After losing in both courts, they filed an action 
in Federal District Court, which was also appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The owners petitioned the 
Kentucky Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court to hear their cases after losing at the appellate level in both 
venues. Neither court opted to take the case.  
 
When the trial court, upon a Motion for Fees by KYTC pursuant to CR 11, imposed sanctions in the form of attorney’s 
fees the Court of Appeals upheld them, noting:  
 
Rule 11 does not provide any substantive right to a party, but rather is a procedural mechanism by 
which courts can prevent and/or punish abusive litigation practices. Lexington Inv. Co. v. Willeroy, 
396 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Ky. App. 2013). While the rule itself does not provide language establishing 
a standard of review, case law has provided such. See Clark Equip. Co., Inc. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 
417 (Ky. App. 1988). First, a reviewing court examines the trial court's findings of fact for clear 
error. Id. at 421. Next, the reviewing court examines the trial court's legal conclusions that a given 
behavior amounts to a violation de novo. Id. Finally, the reviewing court examines the nature and 
severity of the sanction imposed for abuse of discretion. Id.140 
 
Substantial evidence exists in the record that supports the trial court's findings, in the form of 
multiple and voluminous pleadings filed in opposition to the KYTC's already well-established right 
to condemn. The trial court was within its authority, after reviewing the documents filed by the 
McGehees, to determine that they served no purpose other than to delay or harass.141 
 
Benefit 
• Imposing attorney fees can be a deterrent to baseless right-to-take challenges and is another tool in the 
legal toolbox. 
  
                                                                
139 Bernard v. Russell Cty. Air Bd., 747 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Ky. App. 1987). 
140 McGehee v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-CA-000384-MR, Unpub. LEXIS 217, at *8-9 (Ky. App. 2017) emphasis 
added. 
141 Id. at *10.  
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Chapter 6 Review of Other State Statutes 
 
Many states have recourse to quick take processes, which are used to acquire property pursuant to the power of 
eminent domain. These processes let a condemnor acquire title to property before the issue of just compensation 
is resolved. Some states have an expedited procedure after legal action commences, including Kentucky.142 Here, 
once an IOJ and the Commissioners’ Award is deposited with the Circuit Court Clerk, the condemnor has a right to 
possess the property for all purposes enumerated in the petition.i Quick take processes in other states are similar to 
Kentucky’s as condemnors typically obtain right of entry after suit is filed by depositing proposed compensation with 
the court. Methods for determining proposed compensation vary by state and include pre-litigation appraisals, post-
litigation appraisals, using the condemnor’s determined value; others appoint commissioners, special masters, or 
witnesses. Regardless of the process, once funds are available to the property owner, the property is available to 
the condemnor. Several jurisdictions (Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, Vermont) have instituted ex parte processes to acquire property. In all states, individuals have the 
right to challenge a taking. Below we describe several state-level processes.  
 
Alaska  
Quick take authority is limited to electric, communications, water, steam, gas, and easements. Quick take is subject 
to a right-to-take challenge.143 
 
Connecticut  
Connecticut does away with the commissioners and with the need to file a motion to obtain entry. The condemnor 
files a petition and simultaneously deposits compensation with the court. Upon receipt, the court prepares a 
certificate of taking. At that point the compensation vests with the property owner and the property vests with the 
condemnor which has right of entry. Then the property owner must either file a notice of acceptance of just 
compensation or apply for a review of the compensation. A referee is appointed to view the property, receive 
testimony, and report to the court. The report — unless rejected for improper conduct — becomes final and can be 
appealed to the appellate courts. This process is only available to municipalities, but it serves as a sample model.144 
 
District of Columbia  
Modeled after the federal process set forth in 40 U.S.C.S. § 3113 et. seq. At the time of filing, the condemnor makes 
a deposit of the initial offer and takes immediate possession of the property.  
 
Florida  
Modeled after the federal process: “A quick-take condemnation allows title to pass in advance of final judgment but 
is available to a limited group of condemnors. § 74.011, Fla. Stat. (2011).”145 
 
Indiana  
Lacks a quick take provision. The process is similar to Kentucky’s provisions in that it requires negotiations before a 
condemnation action is initiated. After the action is filed, the court appoints appraisers who submit a report stating 
what they believe to be just compensation. If the property owner is not in agreement, the issue of compensation 
goes to trial. In addition, the property owner can challenge the condemnor’s right-to-take the property within 30 
days after being served with the summons. Unlike Kentucky, after the case is filed, but prior to trial, the condemnor 
must make a final offer to purchase the property. If the trial award is greater than the pretrial offer of the 
                                                                
142 As does Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  
143 See DOT & Pub Facilities v. 2.072 Acres, 652 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1982). Excerpt From: Blake, William G., The Law of 
Eminent Domain: Fifty State Survey 2011/2012. 
144 See 7 Nichols on Eminent Domain § G2A.03 (2020). 
145 Excerpt From: Blake, William G., The Law of Eminent Domain: Fifty State Survey 2011/2012, p. 162. 
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condemnor, the condemnor must pay the property owner’s attorney’s fees.146 Unlike Kentucky, the issue of just 
compensation is tried by a court-appointed panel of three disinterested persons: one disinterested freeholder of the 
county and two disinterested licensed appraisers.147 If either party is aggrieved by the panel’s report, they can make 
exceptions to the report and the issue goes to a jury trial.148  
 
Illinois 
The petitioner may file a motion at any time after the complaint to condemn has been filed requesting the immediate 
vesting of title in the petitioner. No motion for quick take is filed without prior approval of the assistant attorney 
general in charge of land acquisition. “Even with the use of quick take procedures, the time between the initial 
request for condemnation and the actual vesting of title is a minimum of ninety days or more.”149 “In the event of 
an appeal [of a right-to-take decision], either the trial or reviewing court may stay further proceedings pending the 




A board of officers initially adopts an order of taking. The order of taking contains (1) a description of the land, (2) 
the interest in the land to be taken, and (3) the purpose of the taking. The board files the order of taking in the 
registry of deeds. On the filing of the order in the registry of deeds, title vests in the body politic for which the board 
adopted the order. The filing vests in the condemnee a right to damages for the taking. After the deed filing has 
been made, a notice is sent to the owner that the property has been condemned. Furthermore, at the time the 
board of officers adopts the order of taking, it also awards damages it has calculated as necessary to compensate 
the owner for the taking. 
 
There is a requirement that appraisals be made of the property. These appraisals help determine the award. After 
filing the order of taking, the board may offer additional settlements to the condemnee. If the condemnee is 
dissatisfied with the award made by the board of officers, they can petition the superior court for an assessment of 
damages. Essentially, in this procedure the condemnee becomes the plaintiff and is subject to a three-year statute 
of limitations in which to challenge the award of compensation made by the board of officers. In addition to 
challenging the award made by the board of officers in the superior court, the condemnee may at that time question 
the right of the condemnor to have initially taken the property.151 
 
Michigan  
“Michigan is a quick-take state. This means the agency obtains title to the property before just compensation is 
ultimately determined, although it must pay its good faith offer to the property owner at the outset of a lawsuit. The 
agency must complete the taking once an owner answers the complaint and cannot dismiss the lawsuit if it believes 
that the just compensation awarded is excessive.” 152 
 
Minnesota  
There are two different processes for condemnation. The normal procedure is long and drawn out. Quick take is an 
alternative procedure which requires a 90-day notice be sent to the property owner and the approved appraisal 
amount be either paid to the property owner or deposited with the court, at which time right of entry is obtained. 
 
                                                                
146 Ind. Stat. Ann. § 32-24-1-1 et seq. 
147 Ind. Stat. Ann. § 32-24-1-7. 
148 Ind. Stat. Ann. § 32-24-1-11. 
149 Illinois Department of Transportation Office of Highways Project Implementation Bureau of Land Acquisition, 
Land Acquisition Policies and Procedures Manual, 4.23, Condemnation, 4.23.1 Request for Condemnation, p. 4-44 
August 2018.  
150 Id .at 4.23.4 Immediate Possession (Quick Take Procedures, pp. 4-47 – 4-48. 
151 7 Nichols on Eminent Domain § G2A.03 (2020). 
152 Jason J. Krentler, MAI, MRICS, Stephon B. Bagne – Clark Hill, PLC, An Introduction to Eminent Domain, Stout, Risius, 
and Ross, https://www.clarkhill.com/uploads/medium/resource/807/introduction-eminent-domain.pdf.  
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New Hampshire  
All condemnation actions are filed with the board of tax and land appeals. That board travels to county courthouses 
to hear all condemnation cases. If the condemnor deposits the appraised value at the time the action is filed, it 
obtains right of entry at the time of filing. However, the property owner may challenge the right-to-take, which 
challenge is heard by the board. The board issues a ruling. If the condemnor is found to have the right to acquire, 
the board hears the compensation issue. The board is not bound by the rules of evidence, and facts are determined 
by balancing the probabilities. Burden of proof for all issues is on the condemnor. 
 
Ohio 
Ohio law requires an attempted voluntary purchase before initiating condemnation proceedings.153 In addition, Ohio 
requires a notice of intent to purchase in a specified form.154 An appraisal is required prior to making a good-faith 
offer.155 After the suit is filed, the property owner can lodge a right-to-take challenge based on the right to make the 
appropriation, the inability of the parties to agree, or the necessity of the appropriation.156 If a challenge is made, 
the court must take the matter not less than five or more than fifteen days from the date the answer was filed.157 If 
the property owner is aggrieved of this decision, it can be appealed.158 However, the decision cannot be appealed 
until there has been a determination of compensation.159  
 
Ohio public agencies have an alternative quick take process. A public agency may deposit with the court, at the time 
of the filing of the petition, an amount determined by the agency to represent the fair market value of the 
condemned property. The agency may then take possession of the property, but not possess or occupy any 
structures on the taken property.160 Property owners can request a stay of any order pending appeal of a decision 
granting an appropriation. 
 
But for our orders in this case, the appellants' property would likely have already been razed. 
Although we reiterate that it is imperative that appellate courts review these cases as expeditiously 
as possible, Pope, 54 Ohio St.2d at 19, 8 O.O.3d 7, 374 N.E.2d 406, we doubt the courts' ability, 
absent the authority to issue a stay, to move more quickly than a bulldozer.161 
 
South Carolina  
Challenges to the right to condemn must be made by filing a separate action. The action must be filed within 30 days 
of receiving the summons in the condemnation action. The purpose requiring a second action challenging the right-
to-take is to keep right-to-take issues separate from compensation issues. The condemnation action is stayed until 
the right-to-take issue is resolved unless both parties agree otherwise.162 “If the court determines the right-to-take 
issue was not raised and litigated in good faith by the landowner, the court must award the condemnor reasonable 
costs and litigation expenses incurred therein.”163 Likewise, if it is determined the condemnor has no right-to-take, 
the landowner’s reasonable costs and litigation expenses must be paid by the condemnor.164 Right-to-take cases can 
take five years or more to resolve.  
                                                                
153 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.04 
154 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.041 
155 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.04. 
156 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.08. 
157 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.09. 
158 Nieman v. Bd. of Educ., 22 Ohio App. 457, 153 N.E. 918 (1925). 
159 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pope, 54 Ohio St. 2d 12, 374 N.E.2d 406 (1978) and City of Cincinnati v. Dimasi, 
2006-Ohio-3345 (Ct. App.). 
160 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.06 
161 City of Norwood v. Horney, 2006-Ohio-3799, ¶ 133, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 391, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1152. 
162 S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-470. 
163 S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510. See Oien Family Investments, LLC, v. Piedmont Municipal Power Agency, 424 S.C. 168, 
817 S.E.2d 647 (Ct. App. 2018). 
164 See Blake, William G., editor, The Law of Eminent Domain: Fifty State Survey 2011/2012; de Holczer, Paul D., 
author South Carolina Chapter, American Bar Association Publishing, 2011-2012, pp. 285, 386. 
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Vermont  
The bulk of the procedure for a municipal condemnation does not require that the parties enter into court 
proceedings. Rather, the governing body of a city, town, or village holds hearings and gives notice to affected owners 
that the governing body intends to condemn their property. It is implied that the governmental unit must negotiate 
and offer a reasonable price for the property before holding the hearings and giving notice. 
 
At the hearings, the governmental body determines just compensation, which must be paid or tendered to affected 
owners before possession of the land may be taken. If the condemnee is dissatisfied with the governing body’s 
award, the governing body may refer the question of the award to a disinterested person “whose award shall be 
made in writing and shall be final.” If the condemnee is still dissatisfied after the award by the disinterested person, 
they may file a petition with the superior court within 60 days of the recording order filed by the governmental body. 
 
The superior court the appoints three disinterested commissioners to inquire into the necessity of the land taken 
and the award amount. Commissioners conduct a hearing and report to the court. The court is not bound by the 
report and may accept or reject the report in part or in whole. The court makes the final determination of just 
compensation. Title to the property vests in the condemnor when the damages reflecting just compensation are 
paid to the person entitled to receive them.165 
 
While many states have quick take provisions, a challenge to an agency’s right to condemn can delay the process, 
even a process intended to move quickly.  
  
                                                                
165 7 Nichols on Eminent Domain § G2A.03 (2020). 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
 
Condemnors rarely lose a right-to-take challenge which makes litigation of this issue both time-consuming and 
fruitless for property owners. Condemnation practitioners in Kentucky have the same delay issues as those in other 
states. However, several other states have statutory recourse which Kentucky does not, both of which can impact 
the amount of time needed to obtain right of entry — (1) the ability to post the state offer as the amount of 
compensation paid, which enables early entry and construction; and (2) awarding attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in a right-to-take challenge. Despite not being codified in statutes, these tools are available to Kentucky 
attorneys. The parties can agree to posting the state offer in lieu of the Commissioners’ Award if circumstances 
motivate the parties to reach such an agreement. This can occur when the state’s offer exceeds the Commissioners’ 
Award, or when the property owner agrees to secure minor but more desirable plan changes. This course of action 
requires flexibility in right-of-way negotiations and teamwork between attorneys and right of way agents. Attorney 
fees are available to condemnors or the property owner if the litigation behavior is egregious or if the arguments 
are so unsubstantial as to violate CR 11.  
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